De Russische premier Vladimir Poetin heeft in het Zwitserse Davos het Wereld Economisch Forum geopend. Hij sloeg daarbij een verzoenende toon aan tegenover het Westen. Volgens Poetin vraagt de economische crisis om wederzijds vertrouwen en zeker niet om meer militaire uitgaven. Poetin waarschuwde verder nog tegen te veel staatsingrijpen in de economie.
donderdag 29 januari 2009
dinsdag 27 januari 2009
Bosnia Leaders Agree New Administrative Setup
Leaders of Bosnia's three strongest ethnic parties on Monday agreed on what appears to be a new administrative and territorial setup for the troubled Balkan country.
The agreement envisages the country divided in four rather than the current two regions set up at the end of the 1992-95 war between Bosnia's Serbs, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats. The joint press statement was signed by Milorad Dodik from the Bosnian Serb Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) Sulejman Tihić from the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Dragan Čović from the Bosnian Croat Democratic Union (HDZ). The statement offered very few information, adding only that the three leaders will work on the details until their next meeting.
Even with such scarce detail, this agreement appeared to represent almost a historic shift from the three men's previous dug-in positions and is expected to raise many questions, local officials and analysts said.
The agreement was reached at a Monday meeting of the three Bosnian leaders in Banja Luka. (see: Meeting between Dodik, Tihic and Covic on the Prud Agreement Realization commenced). During their previous two meetings, the three politicians came up with a framework agreement to resolve a series of issues, which remain key for the closure of the powerful peace overseeer, the Office of the High Representative, and for Bosnia’s continued path towards the EU.
Those issues include division of state property and legalization of the status of Brčko district (which is formally part of both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina).
Their agreements until today were met with criticism and opposition from most other political parties and Monday’s agreement is not expected to have better fate. Although SNSD, SDA and HDZ are by far the three strongest ethnic parties, they lack the majority needed to have their deals adopted through parliaments at the state level and in the Bosniak-Croat Federation.
Leaders’ failure to agree on a more efficient and less complex administrative setup and the failure of the latest constitutional reform in 2005 led to increased political and ethnic tensions and the worst political crisis since the end of the war.
Source: BalkanInsight.com
Check also: Bosnian Serb president discusses constitutional reform, state of economy; RS President Hails Bosnian Political Agreement
The agreement envisages the country divided in four rather than the current two regions set up at the end of the 1992-95 war between Bosnia's Serbs, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats. The joint press statement was signed by Milorad Dodik from the Bosnian Serb Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) Sulejman Tihić from the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Dragan Čović from the Bosnian Croat Democratic Union (HDZ). The statement offered very few information, adding only that the three leaders will work on the details until their next meeting.
Even with such scarce detail, this agreement appeared to represent almost a historic shift from the three men's previous dug-in positions and is expected to raise many questions, local officials and analysts said.
The agreement was reached at a Monday meeting of the three Bosnian leaders in Banja Luka. (see: Meeting between Dodik, Tihic and Covic on the Prud Agreement Realization commenced). During their previous two meetings, the three politicians came up with a framework agreement to resolve a series of issues, which remain key for the closure of the powerful peace overseeer, the Office of the High Representative, and for Bosnia’s continued path towards the EU.
Those issues include division of state property and legalization of the status of Brčko district (which is formally part of both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina).
Their agreements until today were met with criticism and opposition from most other political parties and Monday’s agreement is not expected to have better fate. Although SNSD, SDA and HDZ are by far the three strongest ethnic parties, they lack the majority needed to have their deals adopted through parliaments at the state level and in the Bosniak-Croat Federation.
Leaders’ failure to agree on a more efficient and less complex administrative setup and the failure of the latest constitutional reform in 2005 led to increased political and ethnic tensions and the worst political crisis since the end of the war.
Source: BalkanInsight.com
Check also: Bosnian Serb president discusses constitutional reform, state of economy; RS President Hails Bosnian Political Agreement
donderdag 22 januari 2009
Kosovo roept eigen leger uit, Servië woedend
Bijna een jaar na het uitroepen van de onafhankelijkheid heeft Kosovo een eigen leger samengesteld, dat de komende jaren moet uitgroeien tot 2500 militairen en achthonderd reservisten van de Kosovaarse Veiligheidskrachten (Forcave të Sigurisë së Kosovës - FSK).
De nieuwe strijdmacht, die de goedkeuring heeft van de NAVO-vredestroepen in Kosovo, komt onder gezag te staan van het parlement in Pristina. Het komt in de plaats van het zogeheten Beschermingskorps (Trupat e Mbrojtjes Së Kosovës - TMK), een burgerlijke dienst die voornamelijk bestond uit voormalige strijders van de guerrillabeweging UÇK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). De toekomstige leden van het nieuwe leger moeten zowel Albanees als Servisch kunnen.
Servïe heeft direct woedend gereageerd op de oprichting van het Kosovaarse leger. Belgrado omschrijft de stap als een bedreiging voor de veiligheid van Servië en voor de vrede en stabiliteit in de regio. De Servische minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Vuk Jeremic zei alle diplomatieke middelen te gaan inzetten om het Kosovaarse leger te laten ontbinden.
Zie ook: Serbia Sends Protest Letter Over Kosovo Force
Bron: http://www.wereldomroep.nl/; BalkanInsight.com
De nieuwe strijdmacht, die de goedkeuring heeft van de NAVO-vredestroepen in Kosovo, komt onder gezag te staan van het parlement in Pristina. Het komt in de plaats van het zogeheten Beschermingskorps (Trupat e Mbrojtjes Së Kosovës - TMK), een burgerlijke dienst die voornamelijk bestond uit voormalige strijders van de guerrillabeweging UÇK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). De toekomstige leden van het nieuwe leger moeten zowel Albanees als Servisch kunnen.
Servïe heeft direct woedend gereageerd op de oprichting van het Kosovaarse leger. Belgrado omschrijft de stap als een bedreiging voor de veiligheid van Servië en voor de vrede en stabiliteit in de regio. De Servische minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Vuk Jeremic zei alle diplomatieke middelen te gaan inzetten om het Kosovaarse leger te laten ontbinden.
Zie ook: Serbia Sends Protest Letter Over Kosovo Force
Bron: http://www.wereldomroep.nl/; BalkanInsight.com
woensdag 21 januari 2009
Obama in the Balkans
Albania
Obama To Create New Values-Albania
“Barack Obama’s presidency will create a new chapter of values, not only for the United States, but for the rest of the world,” Albanian Foreign Minister Lulzim Basha said.
Albanians are very pro-American and the US elections are often presented as a standard of democracy in the country, where after 17-plus years of tumultuous transition, electoral practices are still substandard.
Macedonia - Greece
Macedonia Fears Obama Tilt, Greece Confident
Macedonia looks to the inauguration of Barack Obama with some trepidation about a possible shift in the United States' position on the name dispute with Greece, while Athens appears quietly confident that the new US president will be more sympathetic to its stance.
Washington recognized Macedonia under its disputed name during George W. Bush's second term in office, leading Macedonians to view his Republican party as more positively inclined towards them. Many fear that Obama, being a Democrat, might reverse that policy, and find cause to worry in him having signed a pro-Greek initiative back when he was a senator. Commenting on the election of Obama as President, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis said his election was hopeful for Greece. She pointed out that he had supported all resolutions and proposals that were in line with Greek interests as a senator, even referring to Macedonia as 'the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)' -- the name it is using in the UN and other international bodies at Greece's insistence.
Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki said that the new US administration consists of people who know well the situation in south Eastern Europe, and "this could be an advantage that we might use.”“We will continue using consultancy to get in touch to the new administration and most importantly we will bring our political decisions that concern the US in close cooperation with them,” Milososki recently told.
Former minister and Social Democrats MP Radmila Sekerinska noted that the appointment of Hilary Clinton as the head of US foreign policy was also a good omen.“Her supporters, her family and husband played a great role in settling the Balkan crises in the past”, she said, referring to Bill Clinton's role in ending the Kosovo crisis. Sekerinska added that the support of the Republican former United States Secretary of State Collin Powel for Obama’s presidency was a good sign, because “Powel was one of the strongest supporters of Macedonia and according to many the decisive factor for the US recognition of our constitutional name."
In a letter to Obama, Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski stressed the importance Skopje places to its strategic partnership with Washington. He is convinced that “the US will continue supporting Macedonia to take its well-deserved place in NATO as soon as possible”.
Serbia
Obama "Will Not Mean Change For Serbia
Zivorad Kovacevic, a former Yugoslav ambassador to the US and current head of the European Movement NGO told Serbia's Novosti daily that US policy in the Western Balkans would stay in line with current positions."The US administration will be less arrogant and ready to listen, but Obama's policy is the same as Mccain's in context of Serbia and Western Balkans" Kovacevic said, adding that Washington has no dilemmas on Kosovo's status."The story is over for Obama," said Kovacevic. "The new administration believes there is no need to open new talks, neither international nor between Serbia and Kosovo. Obama has called for dialogue only in Kosovo between Serbian communities and the authorities in Pristina, and asked the Serbian government to show understanding for the new reality. Kosovo and Serbia are not among the new administration's 20 priorities." Kovacevic added that Obama supported Serbia's path towards the European Union, but would also insist on the arrest of Mladic. Above all, he said, the US expected Belgrade to not start trouble. "Washington will not mind Serbia sticking to its position about not recognising Kosovo's independence, but it will expect it to contact Kosovo's government specifically on matters regarding the Serbian community and cultural and religious artefacts," he added.
Kosovo
Ahead of his inauguration as the 44th United States president, Barack Obama's winning smile is plastered on billboards and posters all around Kosovo, the most pro-American nation in Europe due to US support for its secession from Serbia.
Washington was among the first capitals to recognise Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia last year, and has continued to stress its support for the Albanian-majority state in international forums. The US was also instrumental in the 1999 NATO bombing that expelled Serb forces accused of ethnic cleansing while fighting a counter-insurgency war.
Obama's path to the White House was keenly watched in Kosovo, with his foreign policy statements covered daily and scrutinised for hints of his future direction on the territory's progress towards full statehood.Recognised by most European Union countries, Kosovo is still under the mandate of international supervisors and is blocked from entering the UN and other international organisations by Serbia and it's big-power ally Russia.
Politicians recognise they rely on the US for muscle, and from early on started efforts to lobby the new president, sending him a letter of congratulations on his victory.
Political analysts say US foreign policy toward Kosovo will not change as Obama had shown his support for Kosovo's independence both with statements and by the choice of his team.
“His political cabinet composed of Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, both important figures in Kosovo’s history, testify as to his approach and attitude toward Kosovo”, analyst Mufial Limani for Balkan Insight.
According to him, the US doesn’t have a “mystic love for Kosovo" but specific interests, adding that its foreign policy was driven by an agenda to protect human rights and spread democracy around the world.
Bosnia
Like in many other countries which are dependent on even the slightest shift in the US foreign policy, the inauguration ceremony of the new US president was broadcast live in Bosnia by several local TV and radio stations.
Preoccupied with Afghanistan and Iraq and wanting the European Union to pick up the slack in its own back yard, the previous US administration under George W. Bush significantly reduced its political, military and financial presence in the Balkans. The shift coincided with deepening political deadlock in Bosnia and new tensions in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia, leading local and international analysts to warn that the situation requires renewed international attention and a new strategic approach from the West.
Commentator Vlastimir Mijovic told state television that because of his culturally and ethnically mixed background, the new US President may have a better perspective on what is going on, and what is needed, in the Balkans.
Romania
Romania's Gypsies, or Roma, once enslaved like African-Americans, and still struggling to overcome deep-seated prejudice seem particularly inspired by Barack Obama’s victory in the US Presidential Election. "When you see that an African-American becomes president, it shows you that the dreams can turn into reality," said Gruia Bumbu, chairman of the National Agency for the Roma. "It's like seeing the light at the end of the tunnel, the fight for equal opportunities can have a happy ending."
Source: BalkanInsight.com
dinsdag 20 januari 2009
Gasconflict Rusland-Oekraïne
Rusland en Oekraïne maakten dit weekend een einde aan hun gasruzie. Volgens de nieuwe overeenkomst krijgt Oekraïne dit jaar een korting van 20 procent op de gasprijs die andere Europese landen betalen. In ruil daarvoor moet het de tarieven voor de doorvoer van gas naar de rest van Europa op hetzelfde niveau houden als in 2008.
Ongeveer 80% van het Russische gas, 120 miljard kubieke meters per jaar, wordt geëxporteerd naar Europa. Alternatieve routes door Polen en de Blauwe Stroom-pijplijn via Turkije kunnen slechts 50 miljard kubieke meters per jaar aan. De Nordstream pijplijn naar Duitsland via de Baltische Zee wordt pas in 2011 voltooid en zal slechts 16 miljard kubieke meters per jaar kunnen vervoeren.
Oekraïne heeft zich in 1991 onafhankelijk van Rusland verklaard, maar heeft tot op de dag van vandaag nog nooit de ‘Europese gasprijs’ moeten betalen. De gasruzie van de laatste weken lijkt meer en meer op een post-Soviet conflict over identiteit, territorium en macht. Andreas Umland geeft in zijn artikel ‘Is the EU becoming an instrument of Moscow’s neo-colonialism?’ een overzicht van de relaties tussen Oekraïne en Rusland.
Ongeveer 80% van het Russische gas, 120 miljard kubieke meters per jaar, wordt geëxporteerd naar Europa. Alternatieve routes door Polen en de Blauwe Stroom-pijplijn via Turkije kunnen slechts 50 miljard kubieke meters per jaar aan. De Nordstream pijplijn naar Duitsland via de Baltische Zee wordt pas in 2011 voltooid en zal slechts 16 miljard kubieke meters per jaar kunnen vervoeren.
Oekraïne heeft zich in 1991 onafhankelijk van Rusland verklaard, maar heeft tot op de dag van vandaag nog nooit de ‘Europese gasprijs’ moeten betalen. De gasruzie van de laatste weken lijkt meer en meer op een post-Soviet conflict over identiteit, territorium en macht. Andreas Umland geeft in zijn artikel ‘Is the EU becoming an instrument of Moscow’s neo-colonialism?’ een overzicht van de relaties tussen Oekraïne en Rusland.
At no time before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has Ukraine been an independent state. During most of its history, much or all of Ukrainian territory was controlled from Moscow – whether by the Tsars or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union secretaries. Kiev is the cradle of all three of the Eastern Slavic nations: Ukrainians, Belarusians and Great Russians. As many of the latter perceive Ukraine as a part of Russia and the West as anti-Russian, they observe Ukrainian-Western rapprochement with suspicion, if not hostility. Russian elites see Ukraine as lying within their legitimate sphere of interests, and deny Kiev full sovereignty. The Ukrainian elites seek sustainable independence above all from Russia, and a way for Ukraine into the European Union.
De laatste jaren zijn Rusland en Oekraïne meer en meer afhankelijk van elkaar geworden.
Whereas Ukraine is dependent on Russian gas and oil, Russia depends on Ukraine’s cooperation in the transportation of its energy resources to its major clients in the EU. This created a healthy balance in Russian-Ukrainian relations. For instance, Moscow might have been interested in using its influence among the population of Crimea to broach the issue of the peninsula’s separation from Ukraine, following the model of Russian support for separatism in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But until recently, Kiev would have retaliated against any such attempts by way of threatening to suspend gas deliveries from Russia to the West.
Door het arriveren van EU waarnemers, wordt die wederzijdse afhankelijkheid afgezwakt.
Hoe het ook zij, beide partijen komen gehavend uit het conflict en beiden hebben de belangen van de Europese Unie naast zich neer gelegd. Vooral Oekraïne heeft zich nogmaals ontpopt als een onbetrouwbare handelspartner en geen geschikte kandidaat om toe te treden tot de Europese Unie of NATO. Opmerkelijk vond ik de perceptie van Oekraïne in het westen. Waar tijdens de gascrisis van 2006 Oekraïne gezien werd als de ‘moedige natie die geterroriseerd wordt door de grote Russische beer’ was dit ditmaal anders. Misschien betekent dit wel een verandering in de (overwegend negatieve) berichtgeving over Rusland?
Het conflict
Vladimir Frolov geeft in ‘The pipe is blocked in Kiev’ een overzicht van het gasconflict:
On October 2008, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko had a nice fire-side chat with Putin at his dacha near Moscow. During the conversation the two reached a strategic deal that envisioned a comfortable gas price for Ukraine for 2009 and beyond (we now can surmise that the offer was around a reasonable $250 per cubic meter) in exchange for Gazprom’s acquisition of a 50% stake in the Ukrainian gas transportation system (along the lines of a similar agreement with Belarus) and Gazprom’s right to directly supply gas to (and collect payments from) Ukrainian customers.
Timoshenko, for her part sought to cut out the middleman – Rosukrenergo (RUE), an international trading company registered in the Swiss canton of Zug, half-owned directly by Gazprom and half owned by a group of shadowy Ukrainian businessmen led by Dmitro Firtash. Timoshenko got Moscow to agree that all future gas contracts will be signed directly between Gazprom and Naftogaz (controlled by Timoshenko’s allies), thus eliminating Rosukrenergo and costing Firtash billions of dollars.
Firtash, however, is a major sponsor of the Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovich. Ukrainian media reports also have alleged that Firtash has been providing black cash payments to President Viktor Yushchenko’s political campaigns and allegedly has Yushchenko’s Secretariat on his payroll. There have also been rumors in Kiev that some of Yushchenko’s closest relatives might have been beneficiaries in RUE.
Firtash is a direct opponent and business rival of Yulia Timoshenko and her team as he and his allies in Yushchenko’s closest circle stand to lose their lucrative business. Firtash is rumored to have helped scuttle the deal between Timoshenko and Yanukovich in December 2008 to form a constitutional majority coalition in the Rada that would have adopted the constitutional reform to abolish the popular vote for the President and make him elected by Parliament. Such a scenario would have been a complete disaster for Yushchenko and his cronies.
President Yushchenko and his situational ally Viktor Yanukovich hated to see Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko reach a gas deal with Moscow at a reasonably good price of $250. This would have strengthened Timoshenko politically and would make her bid for the Presidency in 2010 a lot easier. Neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovich wanted that to happen, so they rushed to block Timoshenko’s efforts to repay Ukrainian debts to Gazprom for 2008 (valued at over $2 billion) and thus scuttled the deal.
Het conflict
Vladimir Frolov geeft in ‘The pipe is blocked in Kiev’ een overzicht van het gasconflict:
On October 2008, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko had a nice fire-side chat with Putin at his dacha near Moscow. During the conversation the two reached a strategic deal that envisioned a comfortable gas price for Ukraine for 2009 and beyond (we now can surmise that the offer was around a reasonable $250 per cubic meter) in exchange for Gazprom’s acquisition of a 50% stake in the Ukrainian gas transportation system (along the lines of a similar agreement with Belarus) and Gazprom’s right to directly supply gas to (and collect payments from) Ukrainian customers.
Timoshenko, for her part sought to cut out the middleman – Rosukrenergo (RUE), an international trading company registered in the Swiss canton of Zug, half-owned directly by Gazprom and half owned by a group of shadowy Ukrainian businessmen led by Dmitro Firtash. Timoshenko got Moscow to agree that all future gas contracts will be signed directly between Gazprom and Naftogaz (controlled by Timoshenko’s allies), thus eliminating Rosukrenergo and costing Firtash billions of dollars.
Firtash, however, is a major sponsor of the Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovich. Ukrainian media reports also have alleged that Firtash has been providing black cash payments to President Viktor Yushchenko’s political campaigns and allegedly has Yushchenko’s Secretariat on his payroll. There have also been rumors in Kiev that some of Yushchenko’s closest relatives might have been beneficiaries in RUE.
Firtash is a direct opponent and business rival of Yulia Timoshenko and her team as he and his allies in Yushchenko’s closest circle stand to lose their lucrative business. Firtash is rumored to have helped scuttle the deal between Timoshenko and Yanukovich in December 2008 to form a constitutional majority coalition in the Rada that would have adopted the constitutional reform to abolish the popular vote for the President and make him elected by Parliament. Such a scenario would have been a complete disaster for Yushchenko and his cronies.
President Yushchenko and his situational ally Viktor Yanukovich hated to see Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko reach a gas deal with Moscow at a reasonably good price of $250. This would have strengthened Timoshenko politically and would make her bid for the Presidency in 2010 a lot easier. Neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovich wanted that to happen, so they rushed to block Timoshenko’s efforts to repay Ukrainian debts to Gazprom for 2008 (valued at over $2 billion) and thus scuttled the deal.
Bron: www.russiaprofile.org
Zie ook: http://russland.ru/gasstreit/index.php
Labels:
Blue Stream,
Nord Stream,
Oekraïne,
Rusland-energie
maandag 19 januari 2009
Relatie Hongarije - Slovakije verzuurd
Nationalistische spanningen in het grensgebied van Slovakije en Hongarije lopen al een tijdje terug op. En toch wordt in de westerse media bijna niet over dit probleem bericht.
In Hongarije maakt de Slovaakse minderheid 2% van de bevolking uit; terwijl in Slovakije de Hongaarse minderheid 10% van de bevolking bedraagt. De etnische Hongaren in Slovakije zijn nakomelingen van de inwoners van Oostenrijk-Hongarije die door het uiteenvallen van het keizerrijk en de hertekening van de Europese grenzen na de Eerste Wereldoorlog in andere landen terechtkwamen. Nu leven er naar schatting 3 miljoen Hongaren buiten Hongarije (vooral in Roemenië en Servië). Voor de Slovaken betekende het uiteenvallen van Oostenrijk-Hongarije het einde van een periode van gedwongen taalkundige assimilatie; voor de Hongaren kwam er einde aan de band met hun moederland.
Recente gebeurtenissen hebben onder de Slovaken de angst doen groeien dat de etnische Hongaren in Slovakije zich willen afscheuren. De onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van Kosovo schept in hun ogen een precedent, terwijl het wegvallen van de grenscontroles door de uitbreiding van Schengen de etnische Hongaren in de armen van hun taalgenoten over de grens kan drijven. De spanningen zijn aangewakkerd na de verkiezingen van 2006 toen de huidige regering - een coalitie van de linkse partij Smer (Nl: Richting) o.l.v. Robert Fico en Slovenská Národná Strana (Nl: Slovaakse Nationale Partij) o.l.v. Ján Slota - aan de macht kwam. De SNS heeft haar radicaal nationalistische trekjes nooit weggestoken en Ján Slota blijft berucht voor zijn anti-Roma en anti-Hongaarse uitspraken. Jean Monnet - professor Politiek - merkt in "The Slovak-Hungarian 'cold war'" op dat de EU zonder bezwaar een extremistische partij als de SNS heeft toegelaten in de EU en geen problemen lijkt te hebben met de racistische uitlatingen van Slota. Hij heeft daarvoor de volgende verklaring:
Men kan zich nu de vraag stellen of de Europese Unie hier niet moet ingrijpen...
In Hongarije maakt de Slovaakse minderheid 2% van de bevolking uit; terwijl in Slovakije de Hongaarse minderheid 10% van de bevolking bedraagt. De etnische Hongaren in Slovakije zijn nakomelingen van de inwoners van Oostenrijk-Hongarije die door het uiteenvallen van het keizerrijk en de hertekening van de Europese grenzen na de Eerste Wereldoorlog in andere landen terechtkwamen. Nu leven er naar schatting 3 miljoen Hongaren buiten Hongarije (vooral in Roemenië en Servië). Voor de Slovaken betekende het uiteenvallen van Oostenrijk-Hongarije het einde van een periode van gedwongen taalkundige assimilatie; voor de Hongaren kwam er einde aan de band met hun moederland.
Recente gebeurtenissen hebben onder de Slovaken de angst doen groeien dat de etnische Hongaren in Slovakije zich willen afscheuren. De onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van Kosovo schept in hun ogen een precedent, terwijl het wegvallen van de grenscontroles door de uitbreiding van Schengen de etnische Hongaren in de armen van hun taalgenoten over de grens kan drijven. De spanningen zijn aangewakkerd na de verkiezingen van 2006 toen de huidige regering - een coalitie van de linkse partij Smer (Nl: Richting) o.l.v. Robert Fico en Slovenská Národná Strana (Nl: Slovaakse Nationale Partij) o.l.v. Ján Slota - aan de macht kwam. De SNS heeft haar radicaal nationalistische trekjes nooit weggestoken en Ján Slota blijft berucht voor zijn anti-Roma en anti-Hongaarse uitspraken. Jean Monnet - professor Politiek - merkt in "The Slovak-Hungarian 'cold war'" op dat de EU zonder bezwaar een extremistische partij als de SNS heeft toegelaten in de EU en geen problemen lijkt te hebben met de racistische uitlatingen van Slota. Hij heeft daarvoor de volgende verklaring:
The Slovak economy is performing well and the country has just joined the eurozone. Slovak diplomacy in Brussels and elsewhere has been thorough and successful in minimising the fallout from Slota's outbursts. The Hungarian government seems helpless and is mostly inactive, fearful of being accused of nationalism. Besides, the EU has precious few instruments that might help. What is surprising, perhaps, is that that the European socialists, usually quick off the mark to speak up for minorities, appear to have no problems with Slota. This becomes more understandable given Smer's left-wing leanings, but all the same it is unexpected that the European left should tolerate Slota's racism and his baiting of Hungarians.
Labels:
Hongarije,
Slovakije,
Slovenská Národná Strana,
Smer
dinsdag 13 januari 2009
Balkan Reforms Lag, Economic Freedoms Weak
Economic freedoms in the Balkans are suffering because of bloated governments, state monopolies, inconsistent regulations and widespread corruption, said the 2009 Index of Economic Freedom report, which stressed that further economic and fiscal reforms were crucial at a time of global recession.
Out of all Balkan countries, Bulgaria was the front runner coming in at 56th place. There was respectable showings by Albania at 62nd place, Romania at 65th and Slovenia at 68th place, which however managed the biggest gains in economic freedom in Europe, improving its score by 2.7 points in 2008.
Macedonia and Montenegro placed in the middle tier, ranking 78th and 94th respectively. The biggest laggards of the region were Serbia at 109, Croatia at 116 and Bosnia-Herzegovina at 134, just ahead of Ethiopia.
"Business freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, and freedom from corruption are weak," the report said of Serbia, while on Croatia it noted that its "overall weakness stems from its outsized government", while "in addition to high levels of government spending, the government's presence in other key areas of the economy is considerable."
Bosnia's position at the bottom of the European pile, ahead only of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, was due to the "inefficient and high government spending, weak property rights, and widespread corruption" that "hold down overall economic freedom...and discourage entrepreneurial activity."
"As a result of sluggish privatization of state-owned enterprises, the private sector's contribution to GDP has grown rather slowly," the entry on Bosnia added. "Bureaucratic and non-transparent regulatory systems remain a problem for foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs."
The report said the low flat tax rates of 10 to 15 percent – among the lowest tax rates in the world – along with strong focus on privatization and internal structural reforms were a driving force for strong growth in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in 2008.
source: BalkanInsight.com
vrijdag 2 januari 2009
Gazprom builds largest underground natural gas reservoir in The Netherlands
Gazprom and four other international energy companies will build Europe’s largest underground natural gas reservoir in The Netherlands at the exhausted Bergermeer field. Construction will begin in the second quarter of next year, after the necessary designs are completed and permits are received. TAQA (Abu Dhabi National Energy Co.) and Gazprom Export will reach a final agreement by that time.
The Dutch state EBN and private DYAS and Petro-Canada will also take part in the project. Their shares in the project will be determined in the coming months, said TAQA Europa representative Allan Virtanen. He said the usable capacity of the reservoir will be 4.1 billion cu. m. and will be launched in the second quarter of 2013. The new reservoir will be strategic for Gazprom because of it lies on the path of the Nord Stream pipeline, now under construction, and because of its proximity to the Zeerbruge hub. The first section of Nord Stream, connecting the Baltic shore of Russia with Germany, will be ready in 2011. Then the pipeline will be extended from Greifswald, Germany, through The Netherlands to Becton, Great Britain. Analysts note that the construction of the reservoir will expand sales opportunities for Gazprom without requiring additional investment in production or transportation. It will also lessen the risk of supply interruption and reduce seasonal factors.
Source: Kommersant
The Dutch state EBN and private DYAS and Petro-Canada will also take part in the project. Their shares in the project will be determined in the coming months, said TAQA Europa representative Allan Virtanen. He said the usable capacity of the reservoir will be 4.1 billion cu. m. and will be launched in the second quarter of 2013. The new reservoir will be strategic for Gazprom because of it lies on the path of the Nord Stream pipeline, now under construction, and because of its proximity to the Zeerbruge hub. The first section of Nord Stream, connecting the Baltic shore of Russia with Germany, will be ready in 2011. Then the pipeline will be extended from Greifswald, Germany, through The Netherlands to Becton, Great Britain. Analysts note that the construction of the reservoir will expand sales opportunities for Gazprom without requiring additional investment in production or transportation. It will also lessen the risk of supply interruption and reduce seasonal factors.
Source: Kommersant
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