Balkan: 20 jaar later

In april is het precies twintig jaar geleden dat de oorlog in Bosnië-Herzegovina begon. Niet minder dan drieënhalf jaar lang duurden de vijandelijkheden, met als trieste dieptepunten de belegering van Sarajevo en het bloedbad in Srebrenica. Het geweld kostte het leven aan naar schatting 100.000 mensen. Stefan Blommaert, die 20 jaar geleden verslag uitbracht over de oorlog, keert nu terug naar de Balkan om na te gaan hoe de situatie er vandaag is. Het resultaat zien we in een reeks in het Journaal en een reportage in Terzake op het Belgische kanaal VRT. 

Na de eerdere strijd in Slovenië en Kroatië werd met de oorlog in Bosnië-Herzogovina een definitief punt gezet achter Joegoslavië. Dat land had na de Tweede Wereldoorlog een bijzonder aanzien gekregen op het internationale toneel. Communistisch, maar met een min of meer menselijk gelaat.
In 1995 maakte het Verdrag van Dayton een einde aan de oorlog in Bosnië, maar de federale staatsstructuur die door het Verdrag werd opgelegd bleek te haperen. De vroegere strijdende partijen (Bosnische moslims, Kroaten en Serviërs) werken elkaar vaak meer tegen dan dat ze samenwerken. De lange regeringsformatie vorig jaar – ruim 400 dagen, net te kort om het Belgisch record te breken – is daar een recent voorbeeld van.

De Balkan - 20 jaar na de oorlog: Van 2 tot 6 april in Het Journaal
Stefan Blommaert trok voor Het Journaal naar vier van de zeven landen die ontstonden uit het puin van Joegoslavië: Bosnië-Herzegovina, Servië, het in 2008 onafhankelijk geworden Kosovo, en Slovenië. Hij portretteert er in totaal tien mensen, uit diverse etnische bevolkingsgroepen, beroepen en leeftijden. Van een muziekleraar en een landbouwer, over een houtskoolmaker en een hiphopdanseres, tot een fotografe en een kaasproducent. Op die manier wordt een gevarieerd beeld geschetst van de mentaliteit, de problemen en verwachtingen van de mensen die op de Balkan wonen. En ook: wat denken ze over de Europese Unie, waar alle ex-Joegoslavische landen uiteindelijk deel van zullen uitmaken. We zien het in vijf reportages vanaf maandag 2 april.

20 jaar geleden begon oorlog in Bosnië-Herzegovina
Nog altijd spanning in het politieke leven in Bosnië
20 jaar na Bosnische oorlog: 40% werkloosheid
Servië blijft politiek en economisch verscheurd
Helft actieve bevolking werkloos in Kosovo
Slovenië: na de oorlog heel snel gemoderniseerd

De Balkan - 20 jaar na de oorlog: Van 2 tot 6 april in Het Journaal
Stefan Blommaert trok voor Het Journaal naar vier van de zeven landen die ontstonden uit het puin van Joegoslavië: Bosnië-Herzegovina, Servië, het in 2008 onafhankelijk geworden Kosovo, en Slovenië. Hij portretteert er in totaal tien mensen, uit diverse etnische bevolkingsgroepen, beroepen en leeftijden. Van een muziekleraar en een landbouwer, over een houtskoolmaker en een hiphopdanseres, tot een fotografe en een kaasproducent. Op die manier wordt een gevarieerd beeld geschetst van de mentaliteit, de problemen en verwachtingen van de mensen die op de Balkan wonen. En ook: wat denken ze over de Europese Unie, waar alle ex-Joegoslavische landen uiteindelijk deel van zullen uitmaken. We zien het in vijf reportages vanaf maandag 2 april.

Is Al Jazeera een voorbeeld voor de hele Balkan?

Bron: www.vrt.be

Supermarktgroep X5 rolt ‘omgekeerde franchise’ uit in Rusland

Supermarktholding X5, de marktleider in Rusland, wil zijn winkelnetwerk flink uitbreiden. Daarbij kiest het voor een systeem van ‘omgekeerde franchise’: een sterke vereenvoudiging van traditionele franchising.
Met omgekeerde franchise hoeven franchisenemers veel minder te investeren. Zo betalen ze een veel lagere franchisevergoeding en hoeven ze ook niet maandelijks licentierechten te betalen. Bovendien hoeven deze ondernemers geen geld te steken in de inkoop, maar worden ze rechtstreeks beleverd door het distributiecentrum van X5. In ruil hiervoor ontvangen de franchisers een vergoeding over de verkopen, die is vastgesteld op zo’n 13 tot 18 procent van de omzet.
Vanuit West-Europees perspectief is deze omgekeerde franchise geen volwaardig ondernemerschap, maar zijn deze franchisers eigenlijk veredelde bedrijfsleiders in loondienst. Voor de Russische markt kan het systeem echter drempelverlagend werken. Ondernemers die dankzij de zogezegde omgekeerde franchise de smaak te pakken krijgen, stimuleren anderen wellicht om ook onder de vleugels van een harde franchise-organisatie een winkel te exploiteren.

In april vorig jaar kondigde X5 al aan met dit omgekeerde franchise-systeem te gaan werken en sinds november 2010 wordt het getest.

Retailgroep X5 is een fusiebedrijf dat is ontstaan in 2006 toen de retailers Pjaterotsjka (soft discount) en Perekrestok (supermarkten, gemakswinkels en hypermarkten) hun krachten bundelden. Op dit moment wordt zo’n 20 procent van het winkelbestand door franchisers geëxploiteerd. Dit betreft vooral Pjaterotsjka-winkels en in mindere mate gemakswinkels (Perekrestok Express) en supermarkten (onder het Paterson-merk, een operatie die X5 in 2009 overnam).

X5 wil met het nieuwe franchisesysteem vooral uitbreiden in Moskou, de regio rondom de hoofdstad en in de meer oostelijk gelegen stad Nizjni Novgorod.

bron: www.retaildetail.eu

Russia — Insights from a changing country

The European Union Institute for Security Studies has published a new report about Russia.

The mass protests in Moscow and other Russian cities after the parliamentary elections on 4 December 2011 shattered long-standing assumptions about the Russian political system and the apathy of Russian society. They raise new questions about the evolution of Russian society and state-society relations. These are extremely serious issues not only for the protesters and external observers, but also for a Russian leadership whose legitimacy is at risk and who, in one way or another, will have to react to this vocal expression of discontent and demand for change.

This EUISS Report features contributions from a group of Russian authors with outstanding expertise on important Russian domestic and foreign policy issues. They all contributed analytical papers to the Institute’s ‘Russia Insights’ series, which were published online during the weeks before the parliamentary and presidential elections. Therefore, some of the papers where written before and some after the public protests started. Together, they provide valuable insights into Russian politics and society and into the country’s economic system as well as into Russia’s foreign policy posture. The result is a very complex picture combining elements of dynamism, stasis and stagnation.

Over the past ten years the Russian political system has been systematically manipulated and tailored to the needs of a small ruling elite whose main strategic goal is the preservation of their political power and access to economic resources. The proverbial ‘power vertical’, completed during Vladimir Putin’s second presidential term, works at the national as well as the regional level.

As Aleksander Kynev demonstrates in his analyses, ‘the party and electoral system today reflects the ruling elite’s efforts to centralise and control’. Electoral and party legislation have become increasingly supportive of United Russia, the so-called ‘party of power’, and increasingly restrictive and discriminating vis-à-vis other parties. This development has severe consequences for the political system and state-society relations: on the one hand political parties have been unable to evolve into stable political entities with a clear profile and substance. As a result the State Duma has degenerated into a rubber stamp forum for the political leadership. The Kremlin on the other hand, has lost all connection with the population (and vice versa). The Russian people are unable to use elections as a means to communicate their wishes to the state, while the state is not attuned to changing societal moods, which explains why it was taken by surprise by the protests after the Duma elections.

Natalia Zubarevich confirms this assessment of the dysfunctionality of the power vertical for the relationship between the centre and the regions. She diagnoses the approaching end of the ‘informal social contract’ between the political leadership and Russian society, whereby Moscow guaranteed low-level economic stability through financial transfers and subsidies to the majority of economically underdeveloped regions. In the light of the economic crisis and growing unemployment, the centre will find it increasingly difficult to face the challenges inherent in Russia’s unreformed federal structures, which are geared to control and co-opt regional elites but do not contribute to the improvement of the quality of governance, regional development and modernisation.

It is in the field of energy that Russian political and economic interests are concentrated. Mikhail Krutikhin delivers a pointed analysis of how state-dominated companies, dysfunctional governance, poor management practices and the rent-seeking behaviour of the elite undermine attempts to reform the outdated Russian energy sector. Modernisation, which in the long run is the only viable strategy to keep this sector competitive at the global level, clashes with the short-term interests of the actors currently in control of the energy sector. This group of veto players, labelled a ‘collective Putin’ by Krutikhin, constantly interferes with political processes in order not to be forced to cede political and economic control.

The authors of this report agree that President Medvedev’s attempts to promote the idea of modernisation in the Russian discourse have done little, if anything, to change the flaws of the political and economic system and to better connect state and society. On the contrary, more often than not they consider Medvedev as ‘part of the problem rather than the solution’ (Krutikhin).

On the other hand, the modernisation debate has encouraged the expression of discontent, first among the broader political and intellectual elite, and, after the Duma elections in December, among Russian society at large. Russians have never developed much trust in their political system. Until recently, however, this distrust was focused on political institutions, while leading political figures, and above all Prime Minister Putin, enjoyed high public support. This has been changing in the past year. The crisis of legitimacy of the political system has turned into a legitimacy crisis that directly affects its leader.

This leads to the question of who is actually demonstrating. Simon Saradzhyan and Nabi Abdullaev claim that today more than 80 percent of the Russian urban population consider themselves to belong to the middle class, which they identify as the main source of public protest. Interestingly, Lilia Ovcharova’s economic analysis of the development and situation of the middle class is much less optimistic. According to her this social stratum has not grown to encompass more than 20 percent of Russian society despite the economic boom of the 2000s, and has been most severely affected by the economic crisis. This contradiction points to a double discrepancy: the majority of people describing themselves as middle class are apparently denied access to economic resources, while at the same time the middle class as a whole is denied appropriate political representation.

Foreign policy issues do not usually play a prominent role in Russian elections. However, back in October Vladimir Putin announced the ‘Eurasian Union’ as a new integration initiative for Russia’s neighbourhood. This idea, which should be seen in the context of Russia’s aspiration to regional great power and global player status, is clearly part of Putin’s election programme. Andrei Zagorski analyses the development of Moscow’s more active integration initiatives in recent years and predicts that, although their success is questionable, they will feature prominently in Putin’s conservative foreign policy agenda, if necessary in competition with the EU. Saradzhyan and Abdullaev suspect that while an intentional reverse of the reset in US-Russian relations is unlikely, the atmosphere may become more tense, particularly if President Obama is voted out of office at the end of the year.

None of the authors voice any doubts as to Vladimir Putin’s eventual return to the Kremlin. The big question for the coming months and years is, therefore, whether the new/old political leadership will be able to respond to the changing societal realities and restore some kind of social contract and consensus to bolster its legitimacy. Putin and his entourage have two options. One is to rely on conservative and extremist forces and seek to broaden their traditional support base among conservative layers of society. The other one is to respond to the demands for more democracy and political liberalisation and modernisation and, by doing so, open the political and economic system to the emerging middle class. In a series of articles on the national question, social policy and democracy, published in several big newspapers in January and February 2012, Putin presents a mix of ideas borrowing from both sides of the political spectrum. This makes it difficult to predict which way he will go. Whether or not the elections will be free, fair and clean, however, will already be an important indicator of Russia’s future development.

Source: www.iss.europa.eu

Protocolo y cultura de los negocios en Rusia. Cómo hacer negocios de forma correcta en Rusia. Ética en los Negocios.

Una visión general del mundo de los negocios en Rusia.
Los rusos son muy tenaces para hacer negocios y suelen tener unas agendas muy apretadas de reuniones. Aunque desde la "rotura" comunista del país muchos negocios se han privatizado, aún quedan bastantes "costumbres" de las que se tenían en las empresas estatales. Para hacer negocios en Rusia hay que tener mucha paciencia y mucho saber buen hacer (lo que se llama "tener mano izquierda"), pues puede encontrarse con algunos comportamientos bastante poco éticos. Aún se puede encontrar algo de corrupción en el mundo de los negocios en Rusia, pero no es una práctica generalizada.

Las reuniones deben ser confirmadas antes de su celebración y si es por escrito mucho mejor; se da con relativa frecuencia las anulaciones de algunas reuniones de forma imprevista y sin explicaciones. La puntualidad es importante en Rusia. Debe tratar de ser lo más puntual posible pues ellos lo consideran bastante importante el tema de la puntualidad.

Después de las presentaciones previas a una reunión se debe proceder al intercambio de las tarjetas de visita. Es un detalle tener por una de sus caras las tarjetas en el idioma local. Se suele indicar el nombre completo, la posición en la empresa y la titulación profesional.

Dada la dificultad del idioma lo mejor que puede hacer es contratar los servicios de un intérprete que le pueden ayudar también en la fase de la traducción e interpretación de los términos de los contratos. El intérprete no se debe sentar entre ellos sino al lado izquierdo de usted o un poco por detrás de ambos (de usted y el anfitrión).

Los trabajadores rusos, tanto empleados como ejecutivos son bastante trabajadores, disciplinados y con gran capacidad de aprendizaje. Siempre suelen estar dispuestos a aprender cosas nuevas.
En cuanto empiezan las presentaciones y conversaciones no vaya "directo al grano" sino que antes charle animadamente sobre aspectos generales sobre temas de poca relevancia o generalistas.
No es común ver en Rusia a mujeres al frente de puestos directivos en las empresas tanto estatales como privadas. Por lo tanto no debe sorprenderle si se sienten extrañados porque usted sea una mujer y tenga un puesto de importancia en la empresa e incluso sea la propietaria de la misma.

Los rusos son muy hospitalarios y muy buenos anfitriones, tanto en el plano personal como en el profesional. No le debe extrañar que estén pendientes en todo momento de usted y que le conviden a cenas y otros eventos.

En el caso del vestuario deberá mantener una línea clásica, que le de un aspecto de seriedad y discreción, manteniendo un aspecto sobrio en sus reuniones de negocios. No obstante las cosas, al igual que en otros muchos países, están cambiando poco a poco (muy poco a poco).
El vestuario está muy condicionado a las temperaturas del país que desde Septiembre hasta Abril pueden ser muy bajas. Sobre todo el invierno es muy duro. Ropa de mucho abrigo y calzado especial para evitar el frío y los resbalones. En verano la temperatura no suele ser muy alta y rara vez se alcanzan los 20º centígrados. Son bastante clásicos en el vestir y amantes de las mejores marcas de moda. En ese sentido está muy occidentalizados. Sus gustos muchas veces no pueden verse satisfechos por sus bajos sueldos.
Los hombres de traje de chaqueta y corbata. Las mujeres de falda y blusa o un conjunto de chaqueta de corte clásico. No es demasiado correcto vestir escotes marcados, espaldas descubiertas y modelos similares para las reuniones de trabajo.

Hay comportamientos que debe evitar como hablar mal de su país, sobre sus políticos o sobre sus costumbres; hacer el signo de OK con los dedos como se hace en otros países es un signo mal visto; saltarse una fila o un turno, es de mala educación, las colas suelen ser habituales en determinados lugares con demasiada frecuencia y por ello deben ser respetadas.

Como buenos anfitriones que son es fácil que le inviten a su casa, pues son muy dados a ello. No se olvide llevar un obsequio para los anfitriones y a sus hijos pequeños, si los tienen. Salvo por razones obvias (salud, religión, etc.) no rechace una invitación a beber, costumbre a la que son muy aficionados. Tampoco es muy correcto rechazar la invitación a comer un plato y a repetir del mismo. Utilice el truco de no terminar del todo la comida, para evitar las repeticiones.

Los rusos son bastante educados, en general, por lo que no se debe tirar nada el suelo, escupir o cualquier otro acto incívico. Una costumbre que empieza a cambiar es la de fumar en cualquier lado sin pedir permiso. No debe extrañarse por ello, si fuman sin pedir permiso a las demás personas.

En la correspondencia comercial ( y personal) se escriben los sobres de la siguiente manera: primero se pone el país, luego la ciudad, luego la dirección de la calle y por último el nombre del destinatario.

Aunque el Estado como elemento intervencionista en los negocios es cada vez menos importante, la cultura de negocios aun contempla de forma muy importante las jerarquías y las cadenas de mando. Aunque a la mayor parte de las reuniones no acudan las jerarquías más altas de la empresa éstas son las que toman las decisiones finales. No obstante, es importante transmitir bien nuestras ideas para que ellos las transmitan bien a sus superiores.

Al finalizar deben dejar todo bien concretado y firmado para evitar futuros problemas en sus relaciones comerciales.

fuente: www.protocolo.org

Presidential elections Russia 2012

With less than a month remaining until the Kremlin vote, the presidential campaign is picking up steam nationwide.

Following a brief look at the five candidates who made it on the ballot, detailing how they got there, who they are and which part of the increasingly politicized Russian populace might tick their name on March 4.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (Влади́мир Влади́мирович Пу́тин) - Еди́ная Росси́я, Yedínaya Rossíya centre-right; conservative

Gennady Andreyevich Zyuganov (Генна́дий Андре́евич Зюга́нов) - Коммунистическая партия Российской Федерации; КПРФ; Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii

Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky (Влади́мир Во́льфович Жирино́вский) - Либерально-Демократическая Партия России (ЛДПР), Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii (LDPR): liberal-democratic
Zhirinovsky was and still remains the nation’s top populist. With slogans such as “a bloke for every broad, a bottle of vodka for every bloke,” his Liberal Democratic Party led the 1993 parliamentary vote with 22 percent, essentially kickstarting Zhirinovsky’s career that has since encompassed many a brawl with opponents on camera and flaming speeches that laughed in the face of all that is politically correct.

Sergey Mikhailovich Mironov (Сергéй Михáйлович Мирóнов) - Справедливая Россия, СР, Spravedlivaya Rossiya: social-democratic. Have a look at his blog. At RIA Novosti Mironov is discribed as 'the undecided one' as he's not really anti-Kremlin as other SR-members.

source: RIA novosti

Mikhail Dmitrievitch Prokhorov (Михаил Дмитриевич Прóхоров) - Правое дело, Pravoye delo: centre right; liberal - democratic - conservative  
Prokhorov, one of Russia’s richest businessmen and owner of the American basketball team the New Jersey Nets, is the only independent candidate to run in the March 4 presidential election. He would like to form his own political party that would be larger than the ruling United Russia.
While he was running Norilsk Nickel, the company became the world's largest producer of nickel and palladium. He is the former chairman of Polyus Gold, Russia's largest gold producer, and former President of ONEXIM Group. He resigned both positions when he entered politics in June, 2011.
According RIA novosti most voters are convinced Prokhorov is a Kremlin project, but for many, it would not matter: a large part of the populace just wants to vote against Putin, and in this situation, any candidate would do. Though the old and the poor would prefer Communist Gennady Zyuganov, many in the middle class are likely to opt for Prokhorov, who braved the street protests this winter (getting pelted once by snowballs from the anarchists) and who made the right political noises, putting forth an admittedly populist program of reforms that targets the “creative class,” promising political freedoms, improving the economic climate and reining in the bureaucracy – in essence, dismantling the legacy of Putin, who is the main target of protesters. But Prokhorov also flirted with the ruling establishment, saying he would not mind being a prime minister under a victorious Putin, or even keep him as the head of the government if Prokhorov himself ascends to the Kremlin, hardly a popular idea with the “creative class,” which is united in its dislike of Putin.
Check also his blog.

More info: RIA Novosti, Vesti.ru

Supermarkten Rusland draaien op volle toeren

De supermarkten in Rusland zijn fors aan het uitbreiden. Hoewel de voedselprijzen stijgen, worden er steeds meer vestigingen in het land geopend.

De X5 Retail Group, de grootste food retailer in het land, heeft plannen om komend jaar 540 supermarkten te openen. Een andere grote speler, Magnit, gaat met 855 super- en hypermarkten in Rusland uitbreiden. Daarnaast heeft kortingsketen Dixy plannen om 150 winkels in de omgeving van Moskou te openen.

Met een omzet van 239 miljard dollar in 2010, is de food sector in Rusland met dertien procent gestegen. Grote spelers zagen hun omzet zelfs met dertig tot veertig procent toenemen.

De Russen lijken zich allerminst zorgen te maken om de stijgende voedselprijzen. Volgens Andrei Klepach, minister van Economische ontwikkeling, zullen de prijzen van graan en vlees met meer dan de voorspelde zeven procent toenemen. “De levensmiddelen worden duurder, maar mensen blijven toch voedsel kopen, ongeacht de prijs.”

Russische consumenten zouden dertig procent van hun besteedbaar inkomen aan voedsel uitgeven. Bij Amerikanen is dat dertien procent. De voedselprijzen in Rusland stegen vorig jaar met 12,9 procent en in januari 2011 met 1,4 procent.

Bron : Moscow Times, Retailnews

Russia’s WTO membership

On 16 December 2011, Russia cleared the final hurdle to become a WTO member. WTO Ministers adopted Russia’s WTO terms of entry at the 8th Ministerial Conference in Geneva. Russia will have to ratify the deal within the next 220 days and would become a fully-fledged WTO member 30 days after it notifies the ratification to the WTO.

As part of the accession accord, Russia has agreed to undertake a series of important commitments to further open its trade regime and accelerate its integration in the world economy. The deal offers a transparent and predictable environment for trade and foreign investment.
From the date of accession, the Russian Federation has committed to fully apply all WTO provisions, with recourse to very few transitional periods (see details below). The Russian Federation’s commitments will include the following:

Market access for goods and services

As part of the accession, Russia concluded 30 bilateral agreements on market access for services and 57 on market access for goods.

Market access for goods — tariff and quota commitments

On average, the final legally binding tariff ceiling for the Russian Federation will be 7.8% compared with a 2011¹ average of 10% for all products²:

• The average tariff ceiling for agriculture products will be 10.8%, lower than the current average  of 13.2%
• The ceiling average for manufactured goods will be 7.3% vs. the 9.5% average today on manufactured imports.

Russia has agreed to lower its tariffs on a wide range of products. Average duties after full implementation of tariff reductions will be:  

• 14.9% for dairy products (current applied tariff 19.8%)
• 10.0% for cereals (current applied tariff 15.1%)
• 7.1% for oilseeds, fats and oils (current applied tariff 9.0%)
• 5.2% for chemicals (current applied tariff 6.5%)
• 12.0% for automobiles (current applied tariff 15.5%)
• 6.2% for electrical machinery (current applied tariff 8.4%)
• 8.0% for wood and paper (current applied tariff 13.4%)

Final tariffs will be bound at zero for cotton and information technology (ITA) products (current applied tariff on ITA products is 5.4%).
The final bound rate will be implemented on the date of accession for more than one third of national tariff lines with another quarter of the tariff cuts to be put in place three years later. The longest implementation period is 8 years for pork, followed by 7 years for motor cars, helicopters and civil aircraft.
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) would be applied to beef, pork, poultry and some whey products. Imports entering the market within the quota will face lower tariffs while higher duties will be applied to products imported outside the quota.
The in-quota and out of quota rates are listed below with the out of quota rates in parentheses:

• For beef 15% (and 55%)
• For pork zero (and 65%). The TRQ for pork will be replaced by a flat top rate of 25% as of 1 January 2020.
• 25% (and 80%) for some selected poultry products
• 10% (and 15%) for some whey products
• Some of these quotas are also subject to member-specific allocations

Market access for services

The Russian Federation has made specific commitments on 11 services sectors and on 116 sub-sectors.
On telecommunications, the foreign equity limitation (49%) would be eliminated four years after accession. The Russian Federation also agreed to apply the terms of the WTO’s Basic Telecommunications Agreement.
Foreign insurance companies would be allowed to establish branches nine years after Russia accedes.
Foreign banks would be allowed to establish subsidiaries. There would be no cap on foreign equity in individual banking institutions, but the overall foreign capital participation in the banking system of the Russian Federation would be limited to 50% (not including foreign capital invested in potentially privatized banks).
On transport services, the Russian Federation made commitments in maritime and road transport services, including the actual transportation of freight and passengers.
On distribution services, Russia would allow 100% foreign-owned companies to engage in wholesale, retail and franchise sectors upon accession to the WTO.

Export duties

Export duties would be fixed for over 700 tariff lines, including certain products in the sectors of fish and crustaceans, mineral fuels and oils, raw hides and skins, wood, pulp and paper and base metals.

General commitments on market access

Quantitative restrictions on imports, such as quotas, bans, permits, prior authorization requirements, licensing requirements or other requirements or restrictions that could not be justified under the WTO provisions would be eliminated and not (re) introduced.
Railway transportation charges on goods in transit would, by 1 July 2013, be applied in a manner which conforms with the WTO provisions. The Russian Federation would apply the same rail transportation charges to imported products as they do to similar products moving between domestic locations. Regulated railway tariffs for transit of goods would be published before their entry into force.
From the date of accession, importers of alcohol, pharmaceuticals and some products with encryption technology would not need import licences.
Upon accession, the Russian Federation would apply the Custom Union Generalised System of Preferences scheme (CU GSP) for developing and least-developed countries. 152 developing countries and least-developed countries benefit from the CU GSP.
Under this scheme, the import duties applicable to products eligible for tariff preferences and originating from developing countries were at the level of 75% of the MFN duty rates and from least-developed countries at the level of 0%. 
The Russian Federation would reform its tariff regime for sugar in 2012, with a view to further liberalisation.
By the date of accession, any tariff exemption for space equipment would be provided on a Most Favoured Nation basis.
No licences would be required for imports of more than a dozen encryption technology products (the list includes electronic digital signature devices, personal smart-cards or wireless radio equipment). For those products, any existing import restrictions would be eliminated. No new restrictions, including experts’ evaluations, approvals, and licences, would be adopted or applied. For those encryption technology related products needing an import licence, expert evaluation and approval would only be needed once.
Products including alcohol, wood and meat would be subject to measures requiring their declaration and/or entry at designated customs checkpoints. Any measures contrary to the WTO Agreement would be eliminated as of the date of accession. The Russian Federation would not apply country-specific customs procedures.
The Russian Federation would apply all its laws, regulations and other measures governing transit of goods (including energy) in conformity with GATT and WTO provisions. From accession, all laws and regulations regarding the application and the level of charges and customs fees imposed in connection with transit would be published.
The Russian Federation would review market access requirements for the establishment of direct branches of foreign banks and securities firms in the context of future negotiations on the accession of the Russian Federation to the OECD or within the framework of the next round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations.
In its participation in preferential trade agreements, Russia would observe the provisions of the WTO Agreement without any differentiating between those agreements already in effect upon accession and those which would come into effect in the future.

Government Procurement Agreement

The Russian Federation intends to join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and would notify this intention to the WTO Government Procurement Committee at the time of accession. Russia would become an observer to the GPA and would initiate negotiations for membership within four years of its accession. Russian government agencies would, upon accession, award contracts in a transparent manner.

Industrial and agricultural subsidies

The Russian Federation would eliminate all its industrial subsidies programmes or modify them so that any subsidy provided would not be contingent upon exportation or upon the use of domestic over imported goods. The Russian Federation would notify its subsidies to the WTO and would not invoke any of the provisions of Articles 27 and 28 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

The total trade distorting agricultural support would not exceed USD 9 billion in 2012 and would be gradually reduced to USD 4.4 billion by 2018.
To avoid excessive concentration of support on individual products, from the date of accession to 31 December 2017, the annual agricultural support going to specific products would not exceed 30% of the agriculture support that is not for specific products.
All agricultural export subsidies will be bound at zero.
The VAT exemption applied to certain domestic agricultural products would be eliminated upon accession.

Pricing of energy

Producers and distributors of natural gas in the Russian Federation would operate on the basis of normal commercial considerations, based on recovery of costs and profit.
The Russian Federation would continue to regulate price supplies to households and other non-commercial users, based on domestic social policy considerations.

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT)

All SPS measures would be developed and applied in the Russian Federation and the Custom Union, in accordance with the WTO Agreement.
The Russian Federation would ensure that all legislation related to technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures complies with the WTO TBT Agreement. 
The Russian Federation would develop and apply international standards on SPS measures through membership and active participation in the Codex Alimentarius, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention. 
The reasons for suspension, cancellation, or refusal of an import permit would be consistent with international standards, recommendations, and guidelines as well as the WTO SPS Agreement.
The Russian Federation would negotiate veterinary export certificates that include requirements different from those of the Custom Union if an exporting country made a substantiated request prior to 1 January 2013 to negotiate such a certificate.
Except in case of serious risks of animal or human health, Rosselkhoznadzor, the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance, would not suspend imports from establishments based on the results of on-site inspection before it had given the exporting country the opportunity to propose corrective measures. Rosselkhoznadzor would send a preliminary report to the competent authority of the exporting country for comments.
The Russian Federation would use international standards for the development of technical regulations unless they were an ineffective or inappropriate means for achieving the pursued objectives.
By the end of 2015, mandatory requirements for telecommunication equipment used in public networks would be limited to the requirements contained in technical regulations adopted consistently with the Eurasian Economic Community and Custom Union agreements.
The Russian Federation would regularly review its lists of products subject to obligatory certification or declaration of conformity, as well as all the technical regulations applied on its territory (Custom Union and Eurasian Economic Community included) to ensure that they remained necessary to achieve the Federation’s objective, in accordance with the WTO TBT Agreement.
Certified accreditation bodies would be replaced by a single national accreditation body no later than 30 June 2012. The name and other information regarding this body would be published on the Rosstandart website and the website of the Custom Union Commission.

Trade-related investment measures

The Russian Federation would ensure that all laws, regulations and other measures related to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures would be consistent with the WTO provisions.
All WTO-inconsistent investment measures, including preferential tariffs or tariff exemptions, applied in relation to the existing automobile investment programmes and any agreements concluded under them would be eliminated by 1 July 2018. No other trade related investment measures inconsistent with the WTO Agreement may be applied after Russia’s accession to the WTO.

Protection of trade-related intellectual property

The Russian Federation would fully apply the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights including provisions for enforcement, without recourse to any transitional period.
The Russian government would continue to take actions against the operation of websites (with servers located in the Russian Federation) that promote illegal distribution of content protected by copyright or related rights.
The Russian Federation would investigate and prosecute companies that illegally distribute objects of copyright or related rights on the Internet.
By the time of its accession, the Russian Federation would apply all rules of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.

Transparency

The provisions of the WTO Agreement would be applied uniformly throughout the Russian Federation territory, including in regions engaging in frontier traffic, special economic zones and other areas where special regimes for tariffs, taxes and regulations could be established. 
All legislation affecting trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights would be published promptly, consistent with WTO requirements. The Russian Federation would regularly update its official publications including websites and make these laws readily available to WTO members, individuals and enterprises.
To improve access to official publications, the Russian Federation would establish an enquiry point providing assistance to members and all other stakeholders.
In particular, the Russian Federation would publish all legislation, affecting trade in goods, services, or intellectual property rights, prior to their adoption and would provide a reasonable period of time, no less than 30 days, for members to comment, except for emergency cases, national security, monetary policy, measures whose publication would impede law enforcement, be contrary to the public interest, or prejudice the commercial interest of particular public or private enterprises. No legislation affecting trade in goods, services or intellectual property rights would become effective prior to publication.
The Russian Federation would provide annual reports to WTO members on developments in its on-going privatization programme for as long as it would be in existence.
Lists of goods and services subject to state price controls would be published in the Rossiiyskaya Gazeta from the date of accession. Russia would apply price controls on certain products and services, including natural gas, raw diamonds, vodka, water supply services, gas transportation services, baby food, medical goods, public transport services and railway transportation services. Price control measures would not be used for purposes of protecting domestic products, or services provided.

Functioning of the Custom Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus

The Custom Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus was created on 1 January 2010. All customs borders were removed between the three countries on 1 July 2011.
From 1 January 2012, the three states would have a single economic space.
The Russian Federation would publish any Custom Union legislation before adoption and would provide a reasonable period of time for WTO members and all stakeholders to comment to the competent Custom Union Body.

Notes :

1. Applied duties refer to the Common External Tariff of the Customs Union in June 2011.

2. Averages are culculated following the methodology used in the World Tariff Profiles. 

source: www.wto.org