Source: EUobserver
vrijdag 8 mei 2009
EU condemns Russian agreement with South Ossetia, Abkhazia
maandag 20 april 2009
Medvedev gives interview for Novaya Gazeta
Last week President Medvedev gave his first exclusive interview to the controversial newspaper Novaya Gazeta (which is renowned for high-profile murders of its investigative journalists, such as Anna Politkovskaya in 2006). According to Albina Kovalyova this has to been seen as one of the most eye-catching in a series of moves that could be deemed “democratic” and are meant to give some hope to Russia’s beleaguered liberal-minded constituency.
During the interview (English translation at the webpage of President Medvedev), the president was asked about the elections in Sochi, Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s trial, and the real transparency of the government member’s earnings. But in response to all of Novaya Gazeta Chief Editor Dmitry Muratov’s provocative questions, Medvedev provided vague, generalized answers. For example, when asked whether the current Khodorkovsky trial has a foreseeable result, Medvedev replied that “for members of the government and for the president, there cannot be any predictions regarding any court case, including the one that you have mentioned.” [Для государственных служащих и для президента никакой предсказуемости в любом судебном процессе, в том числе упомянутом Вами, нет и быть не должно.] When asked about the recent disclosure of government salaries (another of his recent “democratic” initiatives), the president admitted that there was no way of checking whether what government officials and their families declared was true, but restated the importance of such public disclosure. He hopes that his could eventually turn into a “tradition” that could make the government feel more responsible. “It is the first step in the right direction,” the president said.
Medvedev did not use the word “democracy” to describe the direction he wants his country to go in, but he stressed the importance of a civil society that could play an active role in Russia. This, together with his newly-proclaimed desire to build a Russian equivalent of London’s Speakers’ Corner in Hyde Park, suggests that he is interested in implementing some democratic values.
It remains unclear whether Medvedev's interview for Novaya Gazeta was a political move for the benefit of the government or a genuine gesture of support for the paper. Perhaps a combination of the two, it certainly got the attention of his critics, who will now be watching for actions that will back up his vague gesture “in the right direction.”
Recount Confirms Communist Win in Moldova
On 5 April parliamentary elections took place in Moldova. The Communists won 50 percent of votes in the election, followed by the centre-right liberal Party with almost 13 percent of the votes, and the Liberal Democratic Party with 12 percent. A recount in Moldova's disputed election, ordered after violent protests against a Communist victory, have not brought any changes in the standing of parties in parliament.
Opposition parties demand a new election. They say their concern is fraud with voters' lists which they allege contain the names of dead voters and Moldovans working abroad but unable to come back into the country to vote.
The riots in Moldova puzzled a lot of Russian commentators. Even those who are usually ready to answer any question, interpreting any event in the former Soviet Union as a result of the continued rivalry between Russia and its erstwhile Western enemies, were at a loss to explain the events in Chisinau, where a crowd of angry youths seized the buildings of the parliament and the president’s residence, only to ransack and surrender them in a few hours. [see: Moldova: Worse Than a Revolution]
Voronin, Europe's only Communist leader, has long called for further integration with the West while preserving Moldova's longstanding ties with Russia. In power since 2001, he has moved closer to Moscow in recent years and praised the Kremlin's efforts at resolving an 18-year-old separatist rebellion in Russian-speaking Transdnieistria, one of the former Soviet Union's "frozen conflicts."
Sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine, Moldova is Europe's poorest country and home to another frozen conflict involving Russia, in the eastern region of Transnistria, similar to the Georgian disputes with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Some two thirds of Moldovans are of Romanian origin, speaking almost the same language. Most of Moldova's territory used to belong to Romania before the Soviet Union carved it out.
Russian interests are still very much present, as the separatist region of Transnistria, in Moldova's eastern part bordering Ukraine, is home to some 2,000 Russian troops and military equipment.
Source: EUobserver and BalkanInsight
Update [23/04/2009]: Topolanek calls for EU-led investigation in Moldova
donderdag 2 april 2009
Albania and Croatia - new NATO members
Yesterday Albania and Croatia have completed the accession process, and have joined the Alliance as members.
Since 1949, NATO’s membership has increased from 12 to 28 countries through six rounds of enlargement. Albania and Croatia, which were invited to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, formally became members when the accession process was completed on 1 April 2009.
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has, like Albania and Croatia, been participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for a number of years to prepare for possible membership. At Bucharest, Allied leaders agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece. A number of other important decisions concerning enlargement were taken at Bucharest. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to start Intensified Dialogues on their membership aspirations and related reforms. Allied leaders also agreed that Georgia and Ukraine – which were already engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO – will become members in future.
A flag-raising ceremony marking the accession of Albania and Croatia will be held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on April 7th.
Since 1949, NATO’s membership has increased from 12 to 28 countries through six rounds of enlargement. Albania and Croatia, which were invited to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, formally became members when the accession process was completed on 1 April 2009.
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has, like Albania and Croatia, been participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for a number of years to prepare for possible membership. At Bucharest, Allied leaders agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece. A number of other important decisions concerning enlargement were taken at Bucharest. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to start Intensified Dialogues on their membership aspirations and related reforms. Allied leaders also agreed that Georgia and Ukraine – which were already engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO – will become members in future.
A flag-raising ceremony marking the accession of Albania and Croatia will be held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on April 7th.
See also: NATO enlargement
woensdag 1 april 2009
Macedonia elections 2009
Last weekend Macedonia held presidential and municipal elections. Many watched these elections with apprehension, as irregularities in voting caused violent demonstrations during the last elections in June of 2008. This year the OHRID Institute together with the OSCE Mission in Skopje, implemented pre-election project named: Election Awareness and Party Responsibility 2009.
The ruling party's presidential Georgi Ivanov took a convincing lead in the first round of Macedonia's elections, with twice the number of votes as his nearest rival in early vote results. With 15 per cent of the ballots counted, Ivanov had 38.49 per cent, more than twice as much as his nearest rival. The turnout among the 1.8 million registered voters was 51.68 per cent, the election commission said.
The Social Democrats' candidate, Ljubomir Frckovski had 18.4 per cent and was closely followed by the independent runner and controversial former interior minister Ljube Boskoski, with 17.3 per cent.
A second round will bring Ivanov and Frckovksi face to face on 5th April next.
Georgi Ivanov – VMRO DPMNE - political science professor at Skopje Law Faculty; a newcomer on the political scene. Ivanov’s biography states that he founded two NGOs, the Macedonian Law Studies Centre and the Institute for Democracy, Solidarity and Civil Society. The later is particularly active as a think tank, assessing contemporary politics in the country.
He became best known for criticism of the Ohrid peace agreement, which ended the ethnic Albanian insurgency in 2001 by granting more rights to this community. He was especially against new territorial divisions agreed in 2004 – part of the decentralization plan envisaged in the 2001 deal. Ivanov reiterates regularly support for EU and NATO membership as Macedonia's strategic goals.
VMRO DPMNE [Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација – Демократска партија за македонско национално единство - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] centre-right; Christian Democratic orientation; supports Macedonia's admission to NATO and EU. The party, founded in 1990, sees itself as heir to the original VMRO, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, a 19th-century national liberation movement in the Ottoman Empire.
Ljubomir Frckoski – Social Democrats - former interior and foreign minister in the Social Democrat governments during the 1990s; teaches International Law and International Relations at the Faculty of Law in Skopje. As a politician and expert he participated in some of the most important events in Macedonia’s recent history.
Frckoski was one of the experts involved in preparing Macedonia’s first constitution in 1991. From 1990 until 1997, he was a minister in the Social Democrat government, as minister without portfolio until 1992, interior minister from 1992 to 1996, and then foreign minister from 1996 to 1997.
He has slated the government for alleged populism and nationalism, and for leading the country away from its strategic goals in EU and NATO. Frckoski belongs to the French Institute of International Relations, is a member of the International Law Association and is a former Secretary General of the Human Rights Forum. In 2002 he was elected a member of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance for the Council of Europe.
SDSM [Социјалдемократски сојуз на Македонија - Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] centre-left; successor to the League of Communists of Macedonia. The SDSM is the leading opposition party, standing for liberal economic policies, a generally pragmatic approach and for co-operation with the international community. The Social Democrats are seen as moderates who take a conciliatory attitude towards ethnic minorities. With that in mind, they passed a law on decentralization that then opened the way towards eventual EU membership.
Overview of the elections: Macedonian Information Agency and BalkanInsight
vrijdag 27 maart 2009
Fight for control over the Union of Cinematographers of Russia
Nikita Mikhalkov, a charismatic film director and an outspoken Putin loyalist, appears to be winning the fight for control over the Union of Cinematographers of Russia, one of the few remaining influential artistic guilds in Russia. Mikhalkov has been the chairman of the Union since 1997 but was dislodged from his position last December. Under his leadership, a certain rebirth of Russian cinema did indeed take place, but critics point out that most of the profits went to the commercial sector of the Russian cinema industry and to foreign cinema studios.
In December a group of other famous cinema directors elected the 83-year-old Marlen Khutsiyev as the new chairman. Mikhalkov declared the December “gathering” illegitimate and proposed to convene a new congress on March 30, where his supporters are expected to take hold of most of the seats in the Union’s new leadership. Mikhalkov said he would not run for reelection himself.
woensdag 25 maart 2009
Czech government falls
The Czech parliament on Tuesday (24 March) by a razor-thin majority voted down the government led by Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, who currently holds the EU presidency.The vote of non-confidence gathered the necessary 101 votes out of 200 to topple the administration, with four votes from the governing party going with the opposition.
The government will have to resign, but the constitution does not provide a deadline by which new elections need to take place, with EU officials expecting some sort of deal with the opposition so that the current cabinet can stay on until the end of the Czech EU presidency, on 30 June.
The centre-right ODS party led by Mr Topolanek along with the opposition Social Democrats are expected to meet President Vaclav Klaus in the coming days to negotiate a solution.According to the Czech constitution, the president is obliged to accept the resignation of the government and consider two possible solutions: early elections or a new government under political consensus of the parliamentary majority.
The current government, formed by the ODS, the Christian-Democrats and the Greens only retained 96 of the 200 deputies in the lower chamber, depending on the good will of independent MPs. Two former ODS members, Vlastimil Tlusty and Jan Schwippel, as well as two other MPs recently expelled from the Green party, Vera Jakubkova and Olga Zubova, voted with the opposition, AFP reports.
In its motivation for the non-confidence vote, Social Democrat leader Jiri Paroubek said the Czech government was "a disgrace" for the EU because it has no clear position on the union and is unable to ratify the Lisbon treaty in the Czech Republic. Mr Paroubek said the Topolanek government is "sticking to its EU presidency as the only possibility to justify its existence" and is "closing its eyes" to the impact of the global economic crisis.Commenting on the vote, Mr Topolanek admitted the collapse of his government could undermine the EU presidency.
"I believe it can complicate our negotiating power ...partners in Europe have grown used to us negotiating hard. In this sense it can happen that our position will be weakened," he told reporters after the vote. He re-iterated that he would be in favour of early elections this summer if no new government is formed.
The EU commission on Tuesday said it maintained "full trust" that the Czech law would allow the country to continue conducting its EU presidency "as effectively as it has done until now."
"It is for the Czech Republic's democratic process under the constitution to resolve the domestic political issues. The commission is confident that this is done in a way which ensures the full functioning of the Council presidency," a commission statement reads.
source: EUobserver
The government will have to resign, but the constitution does not provide a deadline by which new elections need to take place, with EU officials expecting some sort of deal with the opposition so that the current cabinet can stay on until the end of the Czech EU presidency, on 30 June.
The centre-right ODS party led by Mr Topolanek along with the opposition Social Democrats are expected to meet President Vaclav Klaus in the coming days to negotiate a solution.According to the Czech constitution, the president is obliged to accept the resignation of the government and consider two possible solutions: early elections or a new government under political consensus of the parliamentary majority.
The current government, formed by the ODS, the Christian-Democrats and the Greens only retained 96 of the 200 deputies in the lower chamber, depending on the good will of independent MPs. Two former ODS members, Vlastimil Tlusty and Jan Schwippel, as well as two other MPs recently expelled from the Green party, Vera Jakubkova and Olga Zubova, voted with the opposition, AFP reports.
In its motivation for the non-confidence vote, Social Democrat leader Jiri Paroubek said the Czech government was "a disgrace" for the EU because it has no clear position on the union and is unable to ratify the Lisbon treaty in the Czech Republic. Mr Paroubek said the Topolanek government is "sticking to its EU presidency as the only possibility to justify its existence" and is "closing its eyes" to the impact of the global economic crisis.Commenting on the vote, Mr Topolanek admitted the collapse of his government could undermine the EU presidency.
"I believe it can complicate our negotiating power ...partners in Europe have grown used to us negotiating hard. In this sense it can happen that our position will be weakened," he told reporters after the vote. He re-iterated that he would be in favour of early elections this summer if no new government is formed.
The EU commission on Tuesday said it maintained "full trust" that the Czech law would allow the country to continue conducting its EU presidency "as effectively as it has done until now."
"It is for the Czech Republic's democratic process under the constitution to resolve the domestic political issues. The commission is confident that this is done in a way which ensures the full functioning of the Council presidency," a commission statement reads.
source: EUobserver
vrijdag 20 maart 2009
Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev to remain in office indefinitely
Azerbaijan’s constitutional referendum featured a Soviet-style result, as election officials claimed that more than nine out of every 10 voters expressed approval for lifting presidential term limits. Overall, the Azerbaijan's Central Elections Commission reported a 71 percent turnout for Wednesday's ballot. Only a 25 percent turnout rate was required for the referendum results to stand. The initiative was proposed in December by the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan (New Azerbaijan) Party, which Aliyev heads. The Azerbaijani constitution limited presidents to two five-year terms.
Opposition members fear that the change could turn Azerbaijan’s presidency into a hereditary position, controlled by the Aliyev family. Already, Azerbaijan has set a precedent for dynastic succession in the former Soviet Union: llham Aliyev was preceded in office by his father, Heidar, who died in 2003 after 10 years as president of Azerbaijan. The elder Aliyev is now portrayed in Azerbaijan as the founding father of the modern Azerbaijani state.
Opposition members fear that the change could turn Azerbaijan’s presidency into a hereditary position, controlled by the Aliyev family. Already, Azerbaijan has set a precedent for dynastic succession in the former Soviet Union: llham Aliyev was preceded in office by his father, Heidar, who died in 2003 after 10 years as president of Azerbaijan. The elder Aliyev is now portrayed in Azerbaijan as the founding father of the modern Azerbaijani state.
In a March 19 statement, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) noted that the vote was "transparent, well-organized and held in a peaceful atmosphere."At the same time, PACE took issue with the lack of public debate in the run-up to the referendum. The vote was announced in December, but the official campaign lasted only 28 days. Public television allotted just three hours per week to debates about the various constitutional changes.
Source: EurasiaNet.org
Source: EurasiaNet.org
EU schrapt subsidie Nabucco-pijpleiding
De Nabucco-pijpleiding is vooralsnog geschrapt van een EU-projectenlijst voor grote Europese subsidies. De beoogde financiering voor de gaspijp werd eerder al verlaagd van 250 tot 200 miljoen euro.
De aanleg van de Nabucco-pijpleiding via Turkije naar de EU i stuit op tegenstand van bijna de helft van de lidstaten, zo bleek dinsdag. Vooral Oost-Europese landen willen zo geld vrijmaken voor energieprojecten binnen hun eigen grenzen. Voornaamste tegenstander Duitsland heeft bezwaar tegen de publieke financiering voor private projecten. Het land zou liever zien dat de controversiële pijplijn tussen Rusland en Duitsland, de 'North Stream' op de lijst met gefinancierde projecten komt.
De aanleg van de Nabucco, die wordt gecoördineerd door de Haagse burgemeester Jozias van Aartsen i, beoogt de EU minder afhankelijk te maken van Russische gasleveranties door import vanuit de Kaspische regio. Azerbeidzjan wordt als grootste leverancier gezien. De pijplijn zou in 2014 in gebruik moeten worden genomen.
Het project stuit op problemen door de aarzeling bij de private geldschieters en door de oorlog tussen Rusland en Georgië in augustus 2008. Een obstakel is ook de concurrerende South Stream, die wordt gesteund door het Russische Gazprom. Verscheidene lidstaten van de EU hebben al getekend voor de South Stream, wat hun belang en betrokkenheid bij Nabucco in twijfel trekt.
De Europese Commissie i verklaarde dat de Nabucco pijplijn nog steeds gefinancierd kan worden onder het aangepaste plan. ,,Het feit dat we de naam hebben veranderd, betekent niet dat het hele project van de baan is'', zei de woordvoerder van de commissie.
De aanleg van de Nabucco-pijpleiding via Turkije naar de EU i stuit op tegenstand van bijna de helft van de lidstaten, zo bleek dinsdag. Vooral Oost-Europese landen willen zo geld vrijmaken voor energieprojecten binnen hun eigen grenzen. Voornaamste tegenstander Duitsland heeft bezwaar tegen de publieke financiering voor private projecten. Het land zou liever zien dat de controversiële pijplijn tussen Rusland en Duitsland, de 'North Stream' op de lijst met gefinancierde projecten komt.
De aanleg van de Nabucco, die wordt gecoördineerd door de Haagse burgemeester Jozias van Aartsen i, beoogt de EU minder afhankelijk te maken van Russische gasleveranties door import vanuit de Kaspische regio. Azerbeidzjan wordt als grootste leverancier gezien. De pijplijn zou in 2014 in gebruik moeten worden genomen.
Het project stuit op problemen door de aarzeling bij de private geldschieters en door de oorlog tussen Rusland en Georgië in augustus 2008. Een obstakel is ook de concurrerende South Stream, die wordt gesteund door het Russische Gazprom. Verscheidene lidstaten van de EU hebben al getekend voor de South Stream, wat hun belang en betrokkenheid bij Nabucco in twijfel trekt.
De Europese Commissie i verklaarde dat de Nabucco pijplijn nog steeds gefinancierd kan worden onder het aangepaste plan. ,,Het feit dat we de naam hebben veranderd, betekent niet dat het hele project van de baan is'', zei de woordvoerder van de commissie.
Source: Europa NU
dinsdag 17 maart 2009
Georgië niet naar songfestival in Moskou
Georgië weigert de inzending voor het Eurovisie songfestival aan te passen en zal in mei niet in Moskou op het podium verschijnen.
De organisatoren hadden Georgië opgedragen een ander liedje in te sturen omdat het discoliedje 'We don't wanna put in' te politiek zou zijn. Dit betekent vrij vertaald 'Wij willen geen Poetin' en verwijst naar de vijfdaagse oorlog tussen Rusland en Georgië in augustus.
De Georgiërs hebben daarom besloten zich terug te trekken.
De organisatoren hadden Georgië opgedragen een ander liedje in te sturen omdat het discoliedje 'We don't wanna put in' te politiek zou zijn. Dit betekent vrij vertaald 'Wij willen geen Poetin' en verwijst naar de vijfdaagse oorlog tussen Rusland en Georgië in augustus.
De Georgiërs hebben daarom besloten zich terug te trekken.
maandag 2 maart 2009
Verkiezingen Macedonië
Op 22 maart vinden in Macedonië nieuwe verkiezingen plaats. De belangrijkste kandidaten zijn:
Georgi Ivanov – VMRO DPMNE [Vnatrešna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo] – een centrum-rechtse partij die zichzelf omschrijft als christen-democratisch en die bovendien voorstander is van de toetreding van Macedonië tot de NATO en Europese Unie.
Ljubomir Danailov Frčkoski [Љубомир Данаилов Фрчкоски] – SDSM [Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija] – centrum-links; de opvolger van de communistische partij [SKM - Sojuz na Komunistite na Makedonija] die Macedonië geleid heeft van 1945 tot 1990. Frčkoski was achtereenvolgens Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.
Imer Selmani [Имер Селмани] – Nova Demokratija - Demokracia e Re – een centrum-rechtse partij van etnisch Albanezen die pas in 2008 opgericht werd na een dispuut met Menduh Thaci, de leider van de Democratische Partij van Albanezen DPA - PDSH [Partia Demokratike Shqiptare]. Selmani was voor geruime tijd Minister van Gezondheid.
Agron Buxhaku – BDI [Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim; Mac.: DUI [Demokratska unija za integracija] – de grootste Albanese partij in Macedonië. De partij is na de oorlog in 2001 opgericht uit een samensmelting van het Nationaal Bevrijdingsleger (UÇK) en de Macedonische Veiligheidstroepen. Buxhaku was tot 2005 Minister van Transport.
Nano Ružin [Нано Ружин] – LDP [Liberalno-Demokratska Partija]. Liberaal-Democratische Partij die in 1997 ontstaan is uit een samensmelting van de Liberale en de Democratische Partij. Ružin was jarenlang ambassadeur bij de NAVO.
Ljube Boškoksi [Љубе Бошкоски] – De voormalige Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken treedt op als onafhankelijke presidentskandidaat. Boškoksi wordt beschuldigd van oorlogsmisdaden, maar blijft populair bij de Macedoniërs.
Mirushe Hoxha [Hodza] – PDSH [Partia Demokratike Shqiptare] ook wel DPA [Demokratska Partija na Albancite] genoemd. Hoxha is momenteel professor ‘Feministische letterkunde’ aan de universiteit van Skopje.
Georgi Ivanov – VMRO DPMNE [Vnatrešna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo] – een centrum-rechtse partij die zichzelf omschrijft als christen-democratisch en die bovendien voorstander is van de toetreding van Macedonië tot de NATO en Europese Unie.
Ljubomir Danailov Frčkoski [Љубомир Данаилов Фрчкоски] – SDSM [Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija] – centrum-links; de opvolger van de communistische partij [SKM - Sojuz na Komunistite na Makedonija] die Macedonië geleid heeft van 1945 tot 1990. Frčkoski was achtereenvolgens Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.
Imer Selmani [Имер Селмани] – Nova Demokratija - Demokracia e Re – een centrum-rechtse partij van etnisch Albanezen die pas in 2008 opgericht werd na een dispuut met Menduh Thaci, de leider van de Democratische Partij van Albanezen DPA - PDSH [Partia Demokratike Shqiptare]. Selmani was voor geruime tijd Minister van Gezondheid.
Agron Buxhaku – BDI [Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim; Mac.: DUI [Demokratska unija za integracija] – de grootste Albanese partij in Macedonië. De partij is na de oorlog in 2001 opgericht uit een samensmelting van het Nationaal Bevrijdingsleger (UÇK) en de Macedonische Veiligheidstroepen. Buxhaku was tot 2005 Minister van Transport.
Nano Ružin [Нано Ружин] – LDP [Liberalno-Demokratska Partija]. Liberaal-Democratische Partij die in 1997 ontstaan is uit een samensmelting van de Liberale en de Democratische Partij. Ružin was jarenlang ambassadeur bij de NAVO.
Ljube Boškoksi [Љубе Бошкоски] – De voormalige Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken treedt op als onafhankelijke presidentskandidaat. Boškoksi wordt beschuldigd van oorlogsmisdaden, maar blijft populair bij de Macedoniërs.
Mirushe Hoxha [Hodza] – PDSH [Partia Demokratike Shqiptare] ook wel DPA [Demokratska Partija na Albancite] genoemd. Hoxha is momenteel professor ‘Feministische letterkunde’ aan de universiteit van Skopje.
dinsdag 24 februari 2009
Bosnisch volkslied krijgt tekst
Na tien jaar heeft het Bosnische volkslied eindelijk tekst gekregen.
Opmerkelijk is dat er niet gesproken wordt over de twee entiteiten, noch over de verschillende etnische groepen. Kortom, een 'politiek correct' volkslied:
Ti si svjetlost duse
Vjecne vatre plam
Majko nasa zemljo Bosno
Tebi pripadam
Divno plavo nebo
Hercegovine
U srcu su tvoje rijeke
Tvoje planine
Ponosna i slavna
Krajina predaka
Zivjeces u srcu nasem
Dov'jeka
Pokoljenja tvoja
Kazuju jedno:
Mi idemo u budućnost
Zajedno!
Ti si svjetlost duse
Vjecne vatre plam
Majko nasa zemljo Bosno
Tebi pripadam
Divno plavo nebo
Hercegovine
U srcu su tvoje rijeke
Tvoje planine
Ponosna i slavna
Krajina predaka
Zivjeces u srcu nasem
Dov'jeka
Pokoljenja tvoja
Kazuju jedno:
Mi idemo u budućnost
Zajedno!
dinsdag 17 februari 2009
Oekraïne riskeert faillissement
Bank analysts predict that Ukraine is heading for a historic default on its national debt, in a scenario that could complicate EU-Ukraine relations and have an impact on the recent Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal.
Ukrainian industrial production has plunged 26 percent compared to last year. The hryvna has lost over a third of its value against the US dollar and the International Monetary Fund is hesitating on payments of a rescue loan as Kiev declines to keep down public spending.
The political battle between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko ahead of upcoming presidential elections is making matters worse.
Some experts even fear that Mr Yushchenko will use his influence over the central bank to prevent it from bailing out the Tymoshenko government on debt repayments. "One party could provoke this kind of sovereign default to reap a political benefit," HSBC bank expert Alexander Morozov said. "In that case, Tymoshenko could not fulfill promises to her electorate in terms of paying wages and pensions and so on."
The political battle between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko ahead of upcoming presidential elections is making matters worse.
Some experts even fear that Mr Yushchenko will use his influence over the central bank to prevent it from bailing out the Tymoshenko government on debt repayments. "One party could provoke this kind of sovereign default to reap a political benefit," HSBC bank expert Alexander Morozov said. "In that case, Tymoshenko could not fulfill promises to her electorate in terms of paying wages and pensions and so on."
If Ukraine defaults, Austrian, French, Swedish, Italian and German banks stand to be the worst losers, with collective exposure of around €30 billion ($40bn) in the country, according to the Bank of International Settlements.
The European Commission is monitoring the situation with "concern." But for the time being, there is no talk in the EU of crafting a rescue package from institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as EU states concentrate on the economic fall-out at home.
Source: Europa-nu, EUObserver
donderdag 12 februari 2009
“The Birthday Wish”
Close your eyes. Make a wish. Now blow out the candle. On the first birthday of Kosova’s independence, there is certainly an awful lot to wish for.
Casey Cooper Johnson wenst Kosovo alvast magie toe.
That is why on Kosova’s first birthday party, [...] I have decided to bring one hundred of my favorite magicians from around the world to come and perform miracles on our needy little nation. We’re gonna pull electric bunny rabbits from KEK’s hard hats. We’re gonna turn corrupt officials into frogs. We’re gonna break human rights loose from the chained underwater cage, and leap over the Mitrovica bridge on our motorcycles. We’ll produce factories and farms from our bags of tricks and pull good teachers out of children’s noses. And as the big birthday surprise, we are going to hypnotize Presidents Tadic and Putin and make them irrevocably recognize Kosova’s independence. It’s gonna be a real spectacular show, ladies and gentlemen.
Source: Blog Casey Cooper Johnson
Slovenië ratificeert NATO akkoorden Albanië en Kroatië
Slovenia's parliament ratified the NATO accession of Albania and Croatia on Monday, paving the way for the alliance’s enlargement in the Balkans.
Slovenia’s ratification was keeping NATO officials on their toes. The border dispute with Croatia has already posed big problems in Zagreb’s path towards European Union membership, with Slovenia blocking Croatia's EU accession talks in December. Many in NATO feared that Slovenia might do the same for Croatia’s membership in NATO, leaving both Albania and Croatia out and overshadowing the summit marking the 60-th anniversary of the alliance.
The protocol for Albania was backed unanimously in the Slovenian parliament. Croatia's passed by a large majority although nationalist parties called for a boycott.
Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor said before Monday's vote that the NATO membership issue was different from the EU accession process.
"Slovenia's national interests are not endangered by the debate on Croatia's accession to NATO," he told deputies and urged them to back the ratification.
Source: BalkanInsight
vrijdag 6 februari 2009
Rusland noodzakelijk om Nabucco te laten functioneren?
At last week’s Nabucco summit, the European Union took decisive steps by pledging the firmest possible political support for the project, in order to disperse any doubts that its intention to build a pipeline whose sole purpose is to supply Europe with non-Russian gas is indeed real. This week, the story took an unexpected turn. The Director of the Nabucco project Reinhard Mitschek said that the Nabucco consortium was open to Russia’s participation, and was ready to negotiate.
Russia has been working on its own pipeline dubbed South Stream, which targets Italy and Austria, while Nabucco is supposed to run from Turkey to Austria. The two are perceived as rivals, and the Russian leadership has on more than one occasion voiced concerns over the feasibility and viability of Nabucco, as the consortium comprises only transit countries, and not a single producer. This could be the main reason why Russia came into the picture. The Nabucco pipeline was conceived in 2002 and strongly backed by the United States as a means to free Europe from excessive Russian influence, since Russia has been the source of almost half of the gas the EU consumed.
Central Asian countries have been considered the key producers which could provide the 30 billion cubic meters necessary to fill Nabucco and diversify Europe’s energy supplies. Turkmenistan’s and Kazakhstan’s having participated in last week’s summit was seen as a positive signal that both countries were ready to cooperate. [cfr. EU puts energy hopes into Turkmenistan 'black hole'] The Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that his country is prepared to double gas production in order to participate in Nabucco. At the same time, he pointed out the need for transit contracts with EU countries, as well as funding and a clarification of the EU’s energy policy.
The two other possible alternatives are Iran and the U.S.-backed Iraq. The former would hardly provide Europe with more energy security than Russia does, while the latter is still a very distant possibility.
Gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is already exported to Europe, but it goes via Russia, which imports it and then resells it to consumers.
Central Asian countries have been considered the key producers which could provide the 30 billion cubic meters necessary to fill Nabucco and diversify Europe’s energy supplies. Turkmenistan’s and Kazakhstan’s having participated in last week’s summit was seen as a positive signal that both countries were ready to cooperate. [cfr. EU puts energy hopes into Turkmenistan 'black hole'] The Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that his country is prepared to double gas production in order to participate in Nabucco. At the same time, he pointed out the need for transit contracts with EU countries, as well as funding and a clarification of the EU’s energy policy.
The two other possible alternatives are Iran and the U.S.-backed Iraq. The former would hardly provide Europe with more energy security than Russia does, while the latter is still a very distant possibility.
Gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is already exported to Europe, but it goes via Russia, which imports it and then resells it to consumers.
In any case, Russia and Iran are going to have leverage in the project, since both are members of the Caspian treaty and their approval would be necessary to lay pipelines across the Caspian Sea.
Turkey would be a key transit country for Nabucco, and this could also be a problem. The country, which is aspiring to EU membership, could be tempted to use the pipeline as a bargaining chip to speed up its integration with the union.
Russia could make significant gains from scrapping South Stream and turning to Nabucco instead. The two pipelines have been seen as rivals, and the Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek called South Stream a “direct threat” to Nabucco. The pipelines are going to have the same capacity, and both are scheduled to begin operating in 2013. However, it has been estimated that South Stream could end up costing twice as much as the $8 billion Nabucco. Acting as a major or even the sole gas producer could also help Russia to retain its influence over Europe, marking for a significant gain on the political side.
Source: Russia Profile
donderdag 5 februari 2009
NATO train journeys through South-Eastern Europe
Known as the GLOBSEC Express, the NATO train started running in 2007 with the aim of informally gathering young people from Central and southeastern Europe to discuss the importance of Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO’s role in security provision.
Nice iniciative!
More information: www.globsec.sk
woensdag 4 februari 2009
Val Letse regering?
As unrest spreads in Latvia as a result of the worsening economic crisis, the government faces a no confidence vote in the parliament on Wednesday (4 February).
The vote could see the first European Union government - and the second in Europe after Iceland - felled by the financial and economic turmoil that has hit Latvia harder than most other states in the 27-member bloc.
On Tuesday, the country's agriculture minister resigned in the wake of farmer protests that blocked the main road around the capital, Riga, and saw the agriculture ministry building surrounded by tractors. The farmers lit bonfires outside the ministry building and demanded the minister resign. The government convened an emergency meeting out of which emerged €34 million (22m lats) in fresh aid for the farmers. Shortly after Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis announced the decision, the agriculture minister, Martyns Roze, fell on his sword.
The economic crisis has bludgeoned the country's farmers, whose productivity has slid as prices plunge. The losses are bankrupting rural Latvia, with producers unable to pay their loans and processing firms going out of business.
The industrial sector has also dropped off the cliff, with industrial production dropping 2.5 percent in December, equal to a year-on-year decline of 14.2 percent, according to figures released on Tuesday by Statistics Latvia. The fall comes atop an already steep drop of 3.1 percent in November. Manufacturing has been pummelled in particular, seeing a decline of 18.2 percent on an annual basis.
Some 70 percent of the people have lost faith in the government according to polls and last week, the Union of Greens and Farmers said it would abandon the ruling coalition if the government did not come up with additional aid for farmers.
Source: EUobserver
On Tuesday, the country's agriculture minister resigned in the wake of farmer protests that blocked the main road around the capital, Riga, and saw the agriculture ministry building surrounded by tractors. The farmers lit bonfires outside the ministry building and demanded the minister resign. The government convened an emergency meeting out of which emerged €34 million (22m lats) in fresh aid for the farmers. Shortly after Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis announced the decision, the agriculture minister, Martyns Roze, fell on his sword.
The economic crisis has bludgeoned the country's farmers, whose productivity has slid as prices plunge. The losses are bankrupting rural Latvia, with producers unable to pay their loans and processing firms going out of business.
The industrial sector has also dropped off the cliff, with industrial production dropping 2.5 percent in December, equal to a year-on-year decline of 14.2 percent, according to figures released on Tuesday by Statistics Latvia. The fall comes atop an already steep drop of 3.1 percent in November. Manufacturing has been pummelled in particular, seeing a decline of 18.2 percent on an annual basis.
Some 70 percent of the people have lost faith in the government according to polls and last week, the Union of Greens and Farmers said it would abandon the ruling coalition if the government did not come up with additional aid for farmers.
Source: EUobserver
donderdag 29 januari 2009
Poetin opent Wereld Economisch Forum
De Russische premier Vladimir Poetin heeft in het Zwitserse Davos het Wereld Economisch Forum geopend. Hij sloeg daarbij een verzoenende toon aan tegenover het Westen. Volgens Poetin vraagt de economische crisis om wederzijds vertrouwen en zeker niet om meer militaire uitgaven. Poetin waarschuwde verder nog tegen te veel staatsingrijpen in de economie.
dinsdag 27 januari 2009
Bosnia Leaders Agree New Administrative Setup
Leaders of Bosnia's three strongest ethnic parties on Monday agreed on what appears to be a new administrative and territorial setup for the troubled Balkan country.
The agreement envisages the country divided in four rather than the current two regions set up at the end of the 1992-95 war between Bosnia's Serbs, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats. The joint press statement was signed by Milorad Dodik from the Bosnian Serb Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) Sulejman Tihić from the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Dragan Čović from the Bosnian Croat Democratic Union (HDZ). The statement offered very few information, adding only that the three leaders will work on the details until their next meeting.
Even with such scarce detail, this agreement appeared to represent almost a historic shift from the three men's previous dug-in positions and is expected to raise many questions, local officials and analysts said.
The agreement was reached at a Monday meeting of the three Bosnian leaders in Banja Luka. (see: Meeting between Dodik, Tihic and Covic on the Prud Agreement Realization commenced). During their previous two meetings, the three politicians came up with a framework agreement to resolve a series of issues, which remain key for the closure of the powerful peace overseeer, the Office of the High Representative, and for Bosnia’s continued path towards the EU.
Those issues include division of state property and legalization of the status of Brčko district (which is formally part of both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina).
Their agreements until today were met with criticism and opposition from most other political parties and Monday’s agreement is not expected to have better fate. Although SNSD, SDA and HDZ are by far the three strongest ethnic parties, they lack the majority needed to have their deals adopted through parliaments at the state level and in the Bosniak-Croat Federation.
Leaders’ failure to agree on a more efficient and less complex administrative setup and the failure of the latest constitutional reform in 2005 led to increased political and ethnic tensions and the worst political crisis since the end of the war.
Source: BalkanInsight.com
Check also: Bosnian Serb president discusses constitutional reform, state of economy; RS President Hails Bosnian Political Agreement
The agreement envisages the country divided in four rather than the current two regions set up at the end of the 1992-95 war between Bosnia's Serbs, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats. The joint press statement was signed by Milorad Dodik from the Bosnian Serb Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) Sulejman Tihić from the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Dragan Čović from the Bosnian Croat Democratic Union (HDZ). The statement offered very few information, adding only that the three leaders will work on the details until their next meeting.
Even with such scarce detail, this agreement appeared to represent almost a historic shift from the three men's previous dug-in positions and is expected to raise many questions, local officials and analysts said.
The agreement was reached at a Monday meeting of the three Bosnian leaders in Banja Luka. (see: Meeting between Dodik, Tihic and Covic on the Prud Agreement Realization commenced). During their previous two meetings, the three politicians came up with a framework agreement to resolve a series of issues, which remain key for the closure of the powerful peace overseeer, the Office of the High Representative, and for Bosnia’s continued path towards the EU.
Those issues include division of state property and legalization of the status of Brčko district (which is formally part of both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina).
Their agreements until today were met with criticism and opposition from most other political parties and Monday’s agreement is not expected to have better fate. Although SNSD, SDA and HDZ are by far the three strongest ethnic parties, they lack the majority needed to have their deals adopted through parliaments at the state level and in the Bosniak-Croat Federation.
Leaders’ failure to agree on a more efficient and less complex administrative setup and the failure of the latest constitutional reform in 2005 led to increased political and ethnic tensions and the worst political crisis since the end of the war.
Source: BalkanInsight.com
Check also: Bosnian Serb president discusses constitutional reform, state of economy; RS President Hails Bosnian Political Agreement
donderdag 22 januari 2009
Kosovo roept eigen leger uit, Servië woedend
Bijna een jaar na het uitroepen van de onafhankelijkheid heeft Kosovo een eigen leger samengesteld, dat de komende jaren moet uitgroeien tot 2500 militairen en achthonderd reservisten van de Kosovaarse Veiligheidskrachten (Forcave të Sigurisë së Kosovës - FSK).
De nieuwe strijdmacht, die de goedkeuring heeft van de NAVO-vredestroepen in Kosovo, komt onder gezag te staan van het parlement in Pristina. Het komt in de plaats van het zogeheten Beschermingskorps (Trupat e Mbrojtjes Së Kosovës - TMK), een burgerlijke dienst die voornamelijk bestond uit voormalige strijders van de guerrillabeweging UÇK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). De toekomstige leden van het nieuwe leger moeten zowel Albanees als Servisch kunnen.
Servïe heeft direct woedend gereageerd op de oprichting van het Kosovaarse leger. Belgrado omschrijft de stap als een bedreiging voor de veiligheid van Servië en voor de vrede en stabiliteit in de regio. De Servische minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Vuk Jeremic zei alle diplomatieke middelen te gaan inzetten om het Kosovaarse leger te laten ontbinden.
Zie ook: Serbia Sends Protest Letter Over Kosovo Force
Bron: http://www.wereldomroep.nl/; BalkanInsight.com
De nieuwe strijdmacht, die de goedkeuring heeft van de NAVO-vredestroepen in Kosovo, komt onder gezag te staan van het parlement in Pristina. Het komt in de plaats van het zogeheten Beschermingskorps (Trupat e Mbrojtjes Së Kosovës - TMK), een burgerlijke dienst die voornamelijk bestond uit voormalige strijders van de guerrillabeweging UÇK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). De toekomstige leden van het nieuwe leger moeten zowel Albanees als Servisch kunnen.
Servïe heeft direct woedend gereageerd op de oprichting van het Kosovaarse leger. Belgrado omschrijft de stap als een bedreiging voor de veiligheid van Servië en voor de vrede en stabiliteit in de regio. De Servische minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Vuk Jeremic zei alle diplomatieke middelen te gaan inzetten om het Kosovaarse leger te laten ontbinden.
Zie ook: Serbia Sends Protest Letter Over Kosovo Force
Bron: http://www.wereldomroep.nl/; BalkanInsight.com
woensdag 21 januari 2009
Obama in the Balkans
Albania
Obama To Create New Values-Albania
“Barack Obama’s presidency will create a new chapter of values, not only for the United States, but for the rest of the world,” Albanian Foreign Minister Lulzim Basha said.
Albanians are very pro-American and the US elections are often presented as a standard of democracy in the country, where after 17-plus years of tumultuous transition, electoral practices are still substandard.
Macedonia - Greece
Macedonia Fears Obama Tilt, Greece Confident
Macedonia looks to the inauguration of Barack Obama with some trepidation about a possible shift in the United States' position on the name dispute with Greece, while Athens appears quietly confident that the new US president will be more sympathetic to its stance.
Washington recognized Macedonia under its disputed name during George W. Bush's second term in office, leading Macedonians to view his Republican party as more positively inclined towards them. Many fear that Obama, being a Democrat, might reverse that policy, and find cause to worry in him having signed a pro-Greek initiative back when he was a senator. Commenting on the election of Obama as President, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis said his election was hopeful for Greece. She pointed out that he had supported all resolutions and proposals that were in line with Greek interests as a senator, even referring to Macedonia as 'the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)' -- the name it is using in the UN and other international bodies at Greece's insistence.
Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki said that the new US administration consists of people who know well the situation in south Eastern Europe, and "this could be an advantage that we might use.”“We will continue using consultancy to get in touch to the new administration and most importantly we will bring our political decisions that concern the US in close cooperation with them,” Milososki recently told.
Former minister and Social Democrats MP Radmila Sekerinska noted that the appointment of Hilary Clinton as the head of US foreign policy was also a good omen.“Her supporters, her family and husband played a great role in settling the Balkan crises in the past”, she said, referring to Bill Clinton's role in ending the Kosovo crisis. Sekerinska added that the support of the Republican former United States Secretary of State Collin Powel for Obama’s presidency was a good sign, because “Powel was one of the strongest supporters of Macedonia and according to many the decisive factor for the US recognition of our constitutional name."
In a letter to Obama, Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski stressed the importance Skopje places to its strategic partnership with Washington. He is convinced that “the US will continue supporting Macedonia to take its well-deserved place in NATO as soon as possible”.
Serbia
Obama "Will Not Mean Change For Serbia
Zivorad Kovacevic, a former Yugoslav ambassador to the US and current head of the European Movement NGO told Serbia's Novosti daily that US policy in the Western Balkans would stay in line with current positions."The US administration will be less arrogant and ready to listen, but Obama's policy is the same as Mccain's in context of Serbia and Western Balkans" Kovacevic said, adding that Washington has no dilemmas on Kosovo's status."The story is over for Obama," said Kovacevic. "The new administration believes there is no need to open new talks, neither international nor between Serbia and Kosovo. Obama has called for dialogue only in Kosovo between Serbian communities and the authorities in Pristina, and asked the Serbian government to show understanding for the new reality. Kosovo and Serbia are not among the new administration's 20 priorities." Kovacevic added that Obama supported Serbia's path towards the European Union, but would also insist on the arrest of Mladic. Above all, he said, the US expected Belgrade to not start trouble. "Washington will not mind Serbia sticking to its position about not recognising Kosovo's independence, but it will expect it to contact Kosovo's government specifically on matters regarding the Serbian community and cultural and religious artefacts," he added.
Kosovo
Ahead of his inauguration as the 44th United States president, Barack Obama's winning smile is plastered on billboards and posters all around Kosovo, the most pro-American nation in Europe due to US support for its secession from Serbia.
Washington was among the first capitals to recognise Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia last year, and has continued to stress its support for the Albanian-majority state in international forums. The US was also instrumental in the 1999 NATO bombing that expelled Serb forces accused of ethnic cleansing while fighting a counter-insurgency war.
Obama's path to the White House was keenly watched in Kosovo, with his foreign policy statements covered daily and scrutinised for hints of his future direction on the territory's progress towards full statehood.Recognised by most European Union countries, Kosovo is still under the mandate of international supervisors and is blocked from entering the UN and other international organisations by Serbia and it's big-power ally Russia.
Politicians recognise they rely on the US for muscle, and from early on started efforts to lobby the new president, sending him a letter of congratulations on his victory.
Political analysts say US foreign policy toward Kosovo will not change as Obama had shown his support for Kosovo's independence both with statements and by the choice of his team.
“His political cabinet composed of Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, both important figures in Kosovo’s history, testify as to his approach and attitude toward Kosovo”, analyst Mufial Limani for Balkan Insight.
According to him, the US doesn’t have a “mystic love for Kosovo" but specific interests, adding that its foreign policy was driven by an agenda to protect human rights and spread democracy around the world.
Bosnia
Like in many other countries which are dependent on even the slightest shift in the US foreign policy, the inauguration ceremony of the new US president was broadcast live in Bosnia by several local TV and radio stations.
Preoccupied with Afghanistan and Iraq and wanting the European Union to pick up the slack in its own back yard, the previous US administration under George W. Bush significantly reduced its political, military and financial presence in the Balkans. The shift coincided with deepening political deadlock in Bosnia and new tensions in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia, leading local and international analysts to warn that the situation requires renewed international attention and a new strategic approach from the West.
Commentator Vlastimir Mijovic told state television that because of his culturally and ethnically mixed background, the new US President may have a better perspective on what is going on, and what is needed, in the Balkans.
Romania
Romania's Gypsies, or Roma, once enslaved like African-Americans, and still struggling to overcome deep-seated prejudice seem particularly inspired by Barack Obama’s victory in the US Presidential Election. "When you see that an African-American becomes president, it shows you that the dreams can turn into reality," said Gruia Bumbu, chairman of the National Agency for the Roma. "It's like seeing the light at the end of the tunnel, the fight for equal opportunities can have a happy ending."
Source: BalkanInsight.com
dinsdag 20 januari 2009
Gasconflict Rusland-Oekraïne
Rusland en Oekraïne maakten dit weekend een einde aan hun gasruzie. Volgens de nieuwe overeenkomst krijgt Oekraïne dit jaar een korting van 20 procent op de gasprijs die andere Europese landen betalen. In ruil daarvoor moet het de tarieven voor de doorvoer van gas naar de rest van Europa op hetzelfde niveau houden als in 2008.
Ongeveer 80% van het Russische gas, 120 miljard kubieke meters per jaar, wordt geëxporteerd naar Europa. Alternatieve routes door Polen en de Blauwe Stroom-pijplijn via Turkije kunnen slechts 50 miljard kubieke meters per jaar aan. De Nordstream pijplijn naar Duitsland via de Baltische Zee wordt pas in 2011 voltooid en zal slechts 16 miljard kubieke meters per jaar kunnen vervoeren.
Oekraïne heeft zich in 1991 onafhankelijk van Rusland verklaard, maar heeft tot op de dag van vandaag nog nooit de ‘Europese gasprijs’ moeten betalen. De gasruzie van de laatste weken lijkt meer en meer op een post-Soviet conflict over identiteit, territorium en macht. Andreas Umland geeft in zijn artikel ‘Is the EU becoming an instrument of Moscow’s neo-colonialism?’ een overzicht van de relaties tussen Oekraïne en Rusland.
Ongeveer 80% van het Russische gas, 120 miljard kubieke meters per jaar, wordt geëxporteerd naar Europa. Alternatieve routes door Polen en de Blauwe Stroom-pijplijn via Turkije kunnen slechts 50 miljard kubieke meters per jaar aan. De Nordstream pijplijn naar Duitsland via de Baltische Zee wordt pas in 2011 voltooid en zal slechts 16 miljard kubieke meters per jaar kunnen vervoeren.
Oekraïne heeft zich in 1991 onafhankelijk van Rusland verklaard, maar heeft tot op de dag van vandaag nog nooit de ‘Europese gasprijs’ moeten betalen. De gasruzie van de laatste weken lijkt meer en meer op een post-Soviet conflict over identiteit, territorium en macht. Andreas Umland geeft in zijn artikel ‘Is the EU becoming an instrument of Moscow’s neo-colonialism?’ een overzicht van de relaties tussen Oekraïne en Rusland.
At no time before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has Ukraine been an independent state. During most of its history, much or all of Ukrainian territory was controlled from Moscow – whether by the Tsars or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union secretaries. Kiev is the cradle of all three of the Eastern Slavic nations: Ukrainians, Belarusians and Great Russians. As many of the latter perceive Ukraine as a part of Russia and the West as anti-Russian, they observe Ukrainian-Western rapprochement with suspicion, if not hostility. Russian elites see Ukraine as lying within their legitimate sphere of interests, and deny Kiev full sovereignty. The Ukrainian elites seek sustainable independence above all from Russia, and a way for Ukraine into the European Union.
De laatste jaren zijn Rusland en Oekraïne meer en meer afhankelijk van elkaar geworden.
Whereas Ukraine is dependent on Russian gas and oil, Russia depends on Ukraine’s cooperation in the transportation of its energy resources to its major clients in the EU. This created a healthy balance in Russian-Ukrainian relations. For instance, Moscow might have been interested in using its influence among the population of Crimea to broach the issue of the peninsula’s separation from Ukraine, following the model of Russian support for separatism in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But until recently, Kiev would have retaliated against any such attempts by way of threatening to suspend gas deliveries from Russia to the West.
Door het arriveren van EU waarnemers, wordt die wederzijdse afhankelijkheid afgezwakt.
Hoe het ook zij, beide partijen komen gehavend uit het conflict en beiden hebben de belangen van de Europese Unie naast zich neer gelegd. Vooral Oekraïne heeft zich nogmaals ontpopt als een onbetrouwbare handelspartner en geen geschikte kandidaat om toe te treden tot de Europese Unie of NATO. Opmerkelijk vond ik de perceptie van Oekraïne in het westen. Waar tijdens de gascrisis van 2006 Oekraïne gezien werd als de ‘moedige natie die geterroriseerd wordt door de grote Russische beer’ was dit ditmaal anders. Misschien betekent dit wel een verandering in de (overwegend negatieve) berichtgeving over Rusland?
Het conflict
Vladimir Frolov geeft in ‘The pipe is blocked in Kiev’ een overzicht van het gasconflict:
On October 2008, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko had a nice fire-side chat with Putin at his dacha near Moscow. During the conversation the two reached a strategic deal that envisioned a comfortable gas price for Ukraine for 2009 and beyond (we now can surmise that the offer was around a reasonable $250 per cubic meter) in exchange for Gazprom’s acquisition of a 50% stake in the Ukrainian gas transportation system (along the lines of a similar agreement with Belarus) and Gazprom’s right to directly supply gas to (and collect payments from) Ukrainian customers.
Timoshenko, for her part sought to cut out the middleman – Rosukrenergo (RUE), an international trading company registered in the Swiss canton of Zug, half-owned directly by Gazprom and half owned by a group of shadowy Ukrainian businessmen led by Dmitro Firtash. Timoshenko got Moscow to agree that all future gas contracts will be signed directly between Gazprom and Naftogaz (controlled by Timoshenko’s allies), thus eliminating Rosukrenergo and costing Firtash billions of dollars.
Firtash, however, is a major sponsor of the Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovich. Ukrainian media reports also have alleged that Firtash has been providing black cash payments to President Viktor Yushchenko’s political campaigns and allegedly has Yushchenko’s Secretariat on his payroll. There have also been rumors in Kiev that some of Yushchenko’s closest relatives might have been beneficiaries in RUE.
Firtash is a direct opponent and business rival of Yulia Timoshenko and her team as he and his allies in Yushchenko’s closest circle stand to lose their lucrative business. Firtash is rumored to have helped scuttle the deal between Timoshenko and Yanukovich in December 2008 to form a constitutional majority coalition in the Rada that would have adopted the constitutional reform to abolish the popular vote for the President and make him elected by Parliament. Such a scenario would have been a complete disaster for Yushchenko and his cronies.
President Yushchenko and his situational ally Viktor Yanukovich hated to see Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko reach a gas deal with Moscow at a reasonably good price of $250. This would have strengthened Timoshenko politically and would make her bid for the Presidency in 2010 a lot easier. Neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovich wanted that to happen, so they rushed to block Timoshenko’s efforts to repay Ukrainian debts to Gazprom for 2008 (valued at over $2 billion) and thus scuttled the deal.
Het conflict
Vladimir Frolov geeft in ‘The pipe is blocked in Kiev’ een overzicht van het gasconflict:
On October 2008, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko had a nice fire-side chat with Putin at his dacha near Moscow. During the conversation the two reached a strategic deal that envisioned a comfortable gas price for Ukraine for 2009 and beyond (we now can surmise that the offer was around a reasonable $250 per cubic meter) in exchange for Gazprom’s acquisition of a 50% stake in the Ukrainian gas transportation system (along the lines of a similar agreement with Belarus) and Gazprom’s right to directly supply gas to (and collect payments from) Ukrainian customers.
Timoshenko, for her part sought to cut out the middleman – Rosukrenergo (RUE), an international trading company registered in the Swiss canton of Zug, half-owned directly by Gazprom and half owned by a group of shadowy Ukrainian businessmen led by Dmitro Firtash. Timoshenko got Moscow to agree that all future gas contracts will be signed directly between Gazprom and Naftogaz (controlled by Timoshenko’s allies), thus eliminating Rosukrenergo and costing Firtash billions of dollars.
Firtash, however, is a major sponsor of the Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovich. Ukrainian media reports also have alleged that Firtash has been providing black cash payments to President Viktor Yushchenko’s political campaigns and allegedly has Yushchenko’s Secretariat on his payroll. There have also been rumors in Kiev that some of Yushchenko’s closest relatives might have been beneficiaries in RUE.
Firtash is a direct opponent and business rival of Yulia Timoshenko and her team as he and his allies in Yushchenko’s closest circle stand to lose their lucrative business. Firtash is rumored to have helped scuttle the deal between Timoshenko and Yanukovich in December 2008 to form a constitutional majority coalition in the Rada that would have adopted the constitutional reform to abolish the popular vote for the President and make him elected by Parliament. Such a scenario would have been a complete disaster for Yushchenko and his cronies.
President Yushchenko and his situational ally Viktor Yanukovich hated to see Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko reach a gas deal with Moscow at a reasonably good price of $250. This would have strengthened Timoshenko politically and would make her bid for the Presidency in 2010 a lot easier. Neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovich wanted that to happen, so they rushed to block Timoshenko’s efforts to repay Ukrainian debts to Gazprom for 2008 (valued at over $2 billion) and thus scuttled the deal.
Bron: www.russiaprofile.org
Zie ook: http://russland.ru/gasstreit/index.php
maandag 19 januari 2009
Relatie Hongarije - Slovakije verzuurd
Nationalistische spanningen in het grensgebied van Slovakije en Hongarije lopen al een tijdje terug op. En toch wordt in de westerse media bijna niet over dit probleem bericht.
In Hongarije maakt de Slovaakse minderheid 2% van de bevolking uit; terwijl in Slovakije de Hongaarse minderheid 10% van de bevolking bedraagt. De etnische Hongaren in Slovakije zijn nakomelingen van de inwoners van Oostenrijk-Hongarije die door het uiteenvallen van het keizerrijk en de hertekening van de Europese grenzen na de Eerste Wereldoorlog in andere landen terechtkwamen. Nu leven er naar schatting 3 miljoen Hongaren buiten Hongarije (vooral in Roemenië en Servië). Voor de Slovaken betekende het uiteenvallen van Oostenrijk-Hongarije het einde van een periode van gedwongen taalkundige assimilatie; voor de Hongaren kwam er einde aan de band met hun moederland.
Recente gebeurtenissen hebben onder de Slovaken de angst doen groeien dat de etnische Hongaren in Slovakije zich willen afscheuren. De onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van Kosovo schept in hun ogen een precedent, terwijl het wegvallen van de grenscontroles door de uitbreiding van Schengen de etnische Hongaren in de armen van hun taalgenoten over de grens kan drijven. De spanningen zijn aangewakkerd na de verkiezingen van 2006 toen de huidige regering - een coalitie van de linkse partij Smer (Nl: Richting) o.l.v. Robert Fico en Slovenská Národná Strana (Nl: Slovaakse Nationale Partij) o.l.v. Ján Slota - aan de macht kwam. De SNS heeft haar radicaal nationalistische trekjes nooit weggestoken en Ján Slota blijft berucht voor zijn anti-Roma en anti-Hongaarse uitspraken. Jean Monnet - professor Politiek - merkt in "The Slovak-Hungarian 'cold war'" op dat de EU zonder bezwaar een extremistische partij als de SNS heeft toegelaten in de EU en geen problemen lijkt te hebben met de racistische uitlatingen van Slota. Hij heeft daarvoor de volgende verklaring:
Men kan zich nu de vraag stellen of de Europese Unie hier niet moet ingrijpen...
In Hongarije maakt de Slovaakse minderheid 2% van de bevolking uit; terwijl in Slovakije de Hongaarse minderheid 10% van de bevolking bedraagt. De etnische Hongaren in Slovakije zijn nakomelingen van de inwoners van Oostenrijk-Hongarije die door het uiteenvallen van het keizerrijk en de hertekening van de Europese grenzen na de Eerste Wereldoorlog in andere landen terechtkwamen. Nu leven er naar schatting 3 miljoen Hongaren buiten Hongarije (vooral in Roemenië en Servië). Voor de Slovaken betekende het uiteenvallen van Oostenrijk-Hongarije het einde van een periode van gedwongen taalkundige assimilatie; voor de Hongaren kwam er einde aan de band met hun moederland.
Recente gebeurtenissen hebben onder de Slovaken de angst doen groeien dat de etnische Hongaren in Slovakije zich willen afscheuren. De onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van Kosovo schept in hun ogen een precedent, terwijl het wegvallen van de grenscontroles door de uitbreiding van Schengen de etnische Hongaren in de armen van hun taalgenoten over de grens kan drijven. De spanningen zijn aangewakkerd na de verkiezingen van 2006 toen de huidige regering - een coalitie van de linkse partij Smer (Nl: Richting) o.l.v. Robert Fico en Slovenská Národná Strana (Nl: Slovaakse Nationale Partij) o.l.v. Ján Slota - aan de macht kwam. De SNS heeft haar radicaal nationalistische trekjes nooit weggestoken en Ján Slota blijft berucht voor zijn anti-Roma en anti-Hongaarse uitspraken. Jean Monnet - professor Politiek - merkt in "The Slovak-Hungarian 'cold war'" op dat de EU zonder bezwaar een extremistische partij als de SNS heeft toegelaten in de EU en geen problemen lijkt te hebben met de racistische uitlatingen van Slota. Hij heeft daarvoor de volgende verklaring:
The Slovak economy is performing well and the country has just joined the eurozone. Slovak diplomacy in Brussels and elsewhere has been thorough and successful in minimising the fallout from Slota's outbursts. The Hungarian government seems helpless and is mostly inactive, fearful of being accused of nationalism. Besides, the EU has precious few instruments that might help. What is surprising, perhaps, is that that the European socialists, usually quick off the mark to speak up for minorities, appear to have no problems with Slota. This becomes more understandable given Smer's left-wing leanings, but all the same it is unexpected that the European left should tolerate Slota's racism and his baiting of Hungarians.
dinsdag 13 januari 2009
Balkan Reforms Lag, Economic Freedoms Weak
Economic freedoms in the Balkans are suffering because of bloated governments, state monopolies, inconsistent regulations and widespread corruption, said the 2009 Index of Economic Freedom report, which stressed that further economic and fiscal reforms were crucial at a time of global recession.
Out of all Balkan countries, Bulgaria was the front runner coming in at 56th place. There was respectable showings by Albania at 62nd place, Romania at 65th and Slovenia at 68th place, which however managed the biggest gains in economic freedom in Europe, improving its score by 2.7 points in 2008.
Macedonia and Montenegro placed in the middle tier, ranking 78th and 94th respectively. The biggest laggards of the region were Serbia at 109, Croatia at 116 and Bosnia-Herzegovina at 134, just ahead of Ethiopia.
"Business freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, and freedom from corruption are weak," the report said of Serbia, while on Croatia it noted that its "overall weakness stems from its outsized government", while "in addition to high levels of government spending, the government's presence in other key areas of the economy is considerable."
Bosnia's position at the bottom of the European pile, ahead only of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, was due to the "inefficient and high government spending, weak property rights, and widespread corruption" that "hold down overall economic freedom...and discourage entrepreneurial activity."
"As a result of sluggish privatization of state-owned enterprises, the private sector's contribution to GDP has grown rather slowly," the entry on Bosnia added. "Bureaucratic and non-transparent regulatory systems remain a problem for foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs."
The report said the low flat tax rates of 10 to 15 percent – among the lowest tax rates in the world – along with strong focus on privatization and internal structural reforms were a driving force for strong growth in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in 2008.
source: BalkanInsight.com
vrijdag 2 januari 2009
Gazprom builds largest underground natural gas reservoir in The Netherlands
Gazprom and four other international energy companies will build Europe’s largest underground natural gas reservoir in The Netherlands at the exhausted Bergermeer field. Construction will begin in the second quarter of next year, after the necessary designs are completed and permits are received. TAQA (Abu Dhabi National Energy Co.) and Gazprom Export will reach a final agreement by that time.
The Dutch state EBN and private DYAS and Petro-Canada will also take part in the project. Their shares in the project will be determined in the coming months, said TAQA Europa representative Allan Virtanen. He said the usable capacity of the reservoir will be 4.1 billion cu. m. and will be launched in the second quarter of 2013. The new reservoir will be strategic for Gazprom because of it lies on the path of the Nord Stream pipeline, now under construction, and because of its proximity to the Zeerbruge hub. The first section of Nord Stream, connecting the Baltic shore of Russia with Germany, will be ready in 2011. Then the pipeline will be extended from Greifswald, Germany, through The Netherlands to Becton, Great Britain. Analysts note that the construction of the reservoir will expand sales opportunities for Gazprom without requiring additional investment in production or transportation. It will also lessen the risk of supply interruption and reduce seasonal factors.
Source: Kommersant
The Dutch state EBN and private DYAS and Petro-Canada will also take part in the project. Their shares in the project will be determined in the coming months, said TAQA Europa representative Allan Virtanen. He said the usable capacity of the reservoir will be 4.1 billion cu. m. and will be launched in the second quarter of 2013. The new reservoir will be strategic for Gazprom because of it lies on the path of the Nord Stream pipeline, now under construction, and because of its proximity to the Zeerbruge hub. The first section of Nord Stream, connecting the Baltic shore of Russia with Germany, will be ready in 2011. Then the pipeline will be extended from Greifswald, Germany, through The Netherlands to Becton, Great Britain. Analysts note that the construction of the reservoir will expand sales opportunities for Gazprom without requiring additional investment in production or transportation. It will also lessen the risk of supply interruption and reduce seasonal factors.
Source: Kommersant
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